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Abstract
In an overlapping generations model with financial frictions and the fixed in-
vestment size requirement, Matsuyama (2004, Econometrica) shows that, in the
absence of integrated financial markets, the world economy has a unique steady
state, which is symmetric and stable in the sense that inherently identical countries
converge to the same income level in the long run, regardless of their initial income
level; financial globalization may “break” this symmetric steady state and lead to
cross-country income polarization. He calls this phenomenon “symmetry breaking”
and points out that financial underdevelopment is one of the necessary conditions.
We revisit this result by introducing wealth inequality and the minimum in-
vestment requirement into his framework. Increasing wealth inequality strictly re-
duces the possibility of symmetry breaking; if wealth inequality exceeds a threshold
value, symmetry breaking does not arise at all, regardless of the level of financial
development. Thus, wealth inequality is an equally important factor as financial
development in determining the possibility of symmetry breaking.
We also address some practical issues in this framework, e.g., the conditions
of financial integration, the domestic financial crisis and capital controls, and the
world interest rate shocks and income volatility.
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1 Introduction
Financial globalization is one of the most fiercely debated topics of our times. Some
economists argue that greater openness to financial flows has, by and large, proven essen-
tial for countries aiming to upgrade from lower to middle income status, while significantly
enhancing stability among industrialized countries (Fischer, 1998; Summers, 2000), while
others are more cautious and consider increasing capital account liberalization and free
capital mobility as a potential threat to the stability of global financial system (Bhagwati,
1998; Rodrik, 1998; Stiglitz, 2002). In 1997, the International Monetary Fund (hereafter,
IMF) planned to include capital account convertibility among its mandates. However,
the 1998 Asian financial crisis forced the IMF to put it on hold. The world-wide eco-
nomic turmoil in the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis further forced the IMF
to reconsider its position on capital account liberalization. In November 2012, the IMF
embraced a new “institutional view”, acknowledging the fact that capital flows are more
beneficial and less risky if countries reach certain levels or “thresholds” of financial and
institutional development, and that liberalization needs to be well planned, timed, and
sequenced to ensure that its benefits outweigh the costs (IMF, 2012a,b).
In the literature, financial frictions help explain many puzzling phenomena in the era
of financial globalization, e.g., financial crises, capital flows reversal, sudden stops, excess
volatilities, the Lucas puzzle, the allocation puzzle, the global imbalances, and etc. (Gour-
inchas and Rey, 2014; Korinek and Mendoza, 2014; Mendoza, Quadrini, and Rios-Rull,
2009). Matsuyama (2004) synthesizes the two conflicting views on financial globaliza-
tion in a stylized model with financial frictions and the fixed investment size requirement
(hereafter, FIR). Under international financial autarky (hereafter, autarky), the world
economy has a unique steady state, which is symmetric and stable in the sense that in-
herently identical countries converge to the same income level in the long run, regardless
of their initial income level. Financial globalization may “break” this symmetric steady
state and lead to cross-country income polarization. He calls this phenomenon “symme-
try breaking” and it happens only if the level of financial development in the integrated
countries is below a threshold value; otherwise, if the level of financial development in the
integrated countries is above that threshold value, financial integration unambiguously
leads to income convergence. Thus, in order to avoid symmetry breaking, the financial
sector development can be considered as a “threshold” condition for financial integration,
which is consistent with the IMF’s new “institutional view”. Besides, Matsuyama (2004)
mentions in subsection 7.1 and 7.2 that symmetry breaking may also arise in the presence
of wealth inequality and the minimum investment requirements (hereafter, MIR), while
a complete characterization of multiple steady states is “hopelessly complicated”.
In the meantime, income and wealth inequality is an equally controversial topic as
financial globalization and attracts enormous attention from both academia and public
media. After declining in the first half of the 20th century, income and wealth inequal-
ity makes a comeback, which has profound implications to investment, growth, welfare,
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social and political stability, and etc. (Atkinson, Piketty, and Saez, 2011; Piketty, 2014;
Quadrini and Rios-Rull, 2015; Saez and Zucman, 2014). Antunes and Cavalcanti (2013);
Jaumotte, Lall, and Papageorgiou (2013); Mendoza, Quadrini, and Rios-Rull (2007) inves-
tigate how financial globalization may affect the wealth inequality and welfare. However,
the impacts of wealth inequality on financial globalization are not well studied.
In this paper, we connect these two strands of literature and analyze how wealth
inequality may fundamentally reshape the consequences of financial globalization in the
framework of Matsuyama (2004). In particular, we provide a complete, analytical char-
acterization of symmetry breaking in the presence of wealth inequality and the MIR.1 In-
creasing wealth inequality strictly reduces the possibility of symmetry breaking; if wealth
inequality exceeds a threshold value, symmetry breaking does not arise at all, regardless
of the level of financial development. Thus, wealth inequality is an equally important
factor as financial development in determining the possibility of symmetry breaking.
The intuition is as follows. In a neoclassical, frictionless model, the interest rate
coincides with the rate of return to investment and both decrease in aggregate income.
It is a result of the decreasing marginal product of capital (hereafter, MPK), which we
call the neoclassical effect. Suppose that the world economy consist of a continuum of
inherently identical countries. Under autarky, the interest rate is higher in the poor than
in the rich countries, due to the neoclassical effect; under financial globalization, capital
flows are “downhill” from the rich to the poor countries, leading to income convergence,
and eventually all countries reach the same income level.
In a model with financial frictions, the aggregate credit demand is constrained, which
pushes the interest rate below the marginal rate of return to investment2. Suppose that
the individual investment is indivisible and subject to the MIR. Only the agents who
have the sufficiently high net wealth can meet the MIR and operate the productive
project. We call them entrepreneurs. Other agents can only lend out their wealth and
we call them households. Since the interest rate is below the rate of return to investment,
entrepreneurs prefer to borrow to limit. The higher the aggregate income, the higher the
individual net wealth, the larger (smaller) the mass of entrepreneurs (households), the
larger (smaller) the aggregate credit demand (supply) on the extensive margin. This way,
higher aggregate income tends to push up the interest rate through the extensive margin
channel on the credit market. Under autarky, if this extensive-margin effect dominates
the neoclassical effect, the interest rate is higher in the rich than in the poor countries;
under financial globalization, capital flows are “uphill” from the poor to the rich countries
so that countries are endogenously divided into two groups with different income levels.
Symmetry breaking is essentially a result of the positive interest rate response to
1The FIR in Matsuyama (2004) mt = m is a two-side restriction, i.e., the individual investment size
can neither be lower nor greater than a specific value, while the MIR in our model mt ≥ m is a one-side
restriction. Thus, we relax his assumption on the investment requirement. Besides, his model is virtually
a special case of ours when the wealth distribution in our model is degenerated into a unit mass.
2It holds as long as the aggregate credit supply is not perfectly elastic to the interest rate.
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income changes which ultimately depends on the size of the extensive-margin effect.
Through the extensive-margin channel, financial development and wealth inequality affect
the interest rate response and then the possibility of symmetry breaking.
• The lower the level of financial development, the tighter the borrowing constraints,
the larger the wedge between the interest rate and the rate of return to investment.
Under certain conditions, it is more likely that the extensive-margin effect dominates
the neoclassical effect and the interest rate responds positively to income changes.
It explains the crucial role of financial development in Matsuyama (2004).
• The larger the wealth inequality, the less responsive the aggregate credit demand
and supply to income changes, the weaker the extensive-margin effect, the more
likely the neoclassical effect may dominates the extensive-margin effect and the
interest rate responds negatively to income changes. It explains the crucial role of
wealth inequality in our model.
Then, we use this model to address three practical issues.
First, whether a country should allow financial integration depends on its level of
financial development relative to other financially integrated countries and possibly on
its income level. It is consistent with the empirical evidence (Kose, Prasad, Rogoff,
and Wei, 2009; Kose, Prasad, and Taylor, 2011). Kose, Prasad, Rogoff, and Wei (2010)
show that financial integration leads to better macroeconomic outcomes when certain
threshold conditions are met. Capital account liberalization in the absence of essential
supporting conditions can vitiate the benefits, while economic policies designed to foster
these necessary supporting conditions could be instrumental in more effectively utilizing
the growth gains stemming from financial integration. Here, the extent of financial sector
development is one of the threshold conditions.
Second, for a mild and temporary domestic financial crisis, a country does not need
to impose capital controls, as the economy can recover to its pre-crisis level when the
financial sector resumes its functions; for a severe and prolonged domestic financial crisis,
the less financially developed country may impose capital controls to avoid the economy to
be trapped in a low-income steady state. It is consistent with the IMF’s new “institutional
view” that capital outflow management measures can be introduced temporarily in crisis
situations or when a crisis may be imminent (IMF, 2015).
Third, in the case of the world interest rate shocks, income volatility is much higher in
the less than in the more financially developed countries. Different from the traditional
business cycles literature that analyzes income volatility with the log-linear approximation
around the steady state, we analyze the whole state space of endogenous variables and
the world interest rate shocks may bring a less financially developed country to a entirely
different steady state with income level far from the previous one.
The MIR is a key assumption in our model. It has been extensively used in the
literature to capture the investment indivisibility at the individual level, which is an
4
important feature of business ideas, physical and human capital (Aghion and Bolton,
1997; Banerjee and Moll, 2010; Banerjee and Newman, 1993; Galor and Zeira, 1993;
Piketty, 1997). In the recent literature (Barseghyan and DiCecio, 2011; Buera, Kaboski,
and Shin, 2011; Erosa and Hidalgo-Cabrillana, 2008; Manova, 2013; Midrigan and Xu,
2014), the fixed costs or the entry costs are commonly introduced at the firm level and,
in equilibrium, the individual investment is above a minimum scale. In other words,
introducing either the MIR or the fixed cost makes the individual production set non-
convex and, in the presence of financial frictions, a change in aggregate income affects the
individual’s net wealth and the mass of investors so that aggregate investment adjusts
on the extensive margin. The MIR in our model serves as a short-cut to feature this
mechanism. It significantly simplifies our analysis and allows us to characterize the
dynamic properties for the entire parameter spaces analytically.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the model with
financial frictions and MIR. Section 3 analyzes the equilibrium allocation under autarky
and shows the importance of the extensive-margin effect in generating the positive interest
rate response to income changes. Section 4 explains intuitively the mechanism behind the
symmetry-breaking result and highlights the role of wealth inequality. Section 5 addresses
three practical issues. Section 6 discusses our future research agenda. Technical proofs
and relevant discussions are included in the appendix.
2 The Model
The world economy consists of a continuum of countries, indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]. Countries
are inherently identical except for the initial income level. In each country, a continuum of
agents indexed by j ∈ [0, 1] are born every period and live for two periods, young and old;
agent j is endowed with lj = (1−θ)j units of labor when young and consumes only when
old, where j ∈ (1,∞) follows the Pareto distribution with the cumulative distribution
function G(j) = 1 − −
1
θ
j and θ ∈ (0, 1).3 The population size of each generation is
constant at one. In equilibrium, agents supply the labor endowment inelastically to the
market and the aggregate labor supply is constant at L =
∫∞
1
ljdG(j) = 1.
A final good is internationally tradable and chosen as the numeraire. The final good
can be consumed or used to produce capital goods, which becomes available in the next
period. Capital goods are non-tradable and can be combined with labor to produce final
3The inverse of θ is the tail index of the Pareto distribution. Pareto distribution has been widely used
to feature the income and wealth distribution in the literature (Atkinson, Piketty, and Saez, 2011; Gabaix,
2009; Jones, 2015). In particular, the top tail of the income distribution is very well approximated by
a Pareto distribution (Kuznets and Jenks, 1953; Piketty, 2014; Piketty and Saez, 2003). Besides the
empirical relevance, assuming the Pareto distribution for the labor endowment also allows us to obtain
the analytical solutions. Alternatively, one can also use other forms of distribution, e.g., the uniform
distribution for labor endowment, e.g., lj ∈ [1 − a, 1 + a] with the probability density function 12a . It
makes the analysis much more complicated, without changing our qualitative results.
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goods contemporaneously. Capital fully depreciates after the production. The markets
for final goods, capital goods, and labor are perfectly competitive. There is no uncertainty
in the model economy. Y it denotes aggregate output of final goods, L = 1 and K
i
t denote
the aggregate inputs of labor and capital goods, wit and q
i
t denote the wage rate and the
price of capital goods in country i and period t. To sum up,
Y it =
(
Kit
α
)α(
L
1− α
)1−α
, where α ∈ (0, 1), (1)
qitK
i
t = αY
i
t and w
i
tL = (1− α)Y it . (2)
Each agent is endowed with an indivisible project to produce capital goods subject to
the MIR. Consider agent j born in country i and period t. As shown in the left panel of
figure 1, the agent invest mij,t units of final goods in period t and produce k
i
j,t+1 = Rm
i
j,t
units of capital goods in period t+ 1, if its investment size is no less than a specific value,
mij,t ≥ mit; otherwise, the output is zero.4 The MIR has the function formmit = m(Y it )1−σ
with m > 0. As shown in the right panel of figure 1, the MIR is constant at m for σ = 1
and linear in aggregate income for σ = 0. This function form allows for the possibility
that the MIR may differ in the rich and in the poor country.5
mij,t
kij,t+1
O mi
t
Rmij,t
Linear Project with MIR
Yit
m
i
t
m
O
σ=0
σ=1
MIR and Aggregate Income
Figure 1: Individual Investment Project, MIR, and Aggregate Income
Agents can save the labor income nij,t = w
i
tlj either by producing capital goods at the
marginal rate of return qit+1R or lending out in the credit market at the gross interest rate
rit. The interest rate cannot exceed the marginal rate of return r
i
t ≤ qit+1R; otherwise,
nobody would produce capital goods.
4Despite the nonconvex individual production set, Matsuyama (2007, 2008) argues that assuming a
continuum of agents convexifies the aggregate production set.
5We assume the dependence of the MIR on aggregate income mainly for the analytical purpose. As
shown in section 3, for σ = 0, capital accumulation does not affect the mass of investors so that the
aggregate investment responds only on the intensive margin; for σ = 1, capital accumulation affects the
mass of investors so that aggregate investment responds on the intensive and extensive margins. We
highlight the role of the extensive-margin channel by comparing the results in the two cases.
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Let us start with the case of rit < q
i
t+1R. If agent j can meet the MIR, it prefers to
finance its investment, mij,t, with loans. However, due to limited commitment, it can only
borrow up to a fraction λ of its investment return in the present value and has to use its
own funds as equity capital to cover the gap,
bij,t ≤ λ
qit+1Rm
i
j,t
rit
, and mij,t − bij,t ≤ nij,t, (3)
where λ ∈ (0, 1) reflects the level of financial development.6 Let ψij,t ≡
mij,t−bij,t
mij,t
denote the
agent’s equity-investment ratio. In period t+ 1, it gets the investment return, qit+1Rm
i
j,t,
repays the debt, ritb
i
j,t, and consumes the rest. The equity rate is defined as the rate of
return to its equity capital, Ωij,t ≡
qit+1Rm
i
j,t−ritbij,t
mij,t−bij,t
. Use the borrowing constraint (3) to get,
ψij,t ≥ 1− λ
qit+1R
rit
, (4)
Ωij,t = q
i
t+1R︸ ︷︷ ︸
the project’s rate of return
+ (qit+1R− rit)(
1
ψij,t
− 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
the leverage effect
. (5)
The equity rate exceeds the project’s rate of return qit+1R by the amount of (q
i
t+1R −
rit)(
1
ψij,t
− 1), which is called the leverage effect and depends positively on the spread
(qit+1R − rit) and the debt-equity ratio ( 1ψij,t − 1). Given the positive spread q
i
t+1R > r
i
t,
the agent maximizes the leverage effect by borrowing to the limit so that equality holds
in (4) and ψij,t does not depend on the agent’s net wealth. The positive leverage effect
induces the agent to invest its entire labor income in the project, mij,t − bij,t = nij,t.
If rit = q
i
t+1R, the leverage effect vanishes and Ω
i
j,t = r
i
t. Thus, the agent is indifferent
between investing in the project or lending. In this case, mij,t and ψ
i
j,t are indeterminate.
To sum up,
ψij,t
= ψit ≡ 1− λ
qit+1R
rit
, and is wealth-independent, if rit < q
i
t+1R;
≥ 1− λ qit+1R
rit
, and is indeterminate, if rit = q
i
t+1R;
(6)
Ωij,t = Ω
i
t =
qit+1R + (qit+1R− rit)( 1ψit − 1) > qit+1R, if rit < qit+1R;qit+1R, if rit = qit+1R; (7)
mij,t
=
nij,t
ψit
=
wit
ψit
(1− θ)j, and is linear in labor income, if rit < qit+1R;
≤ nij,t
ψit
, and is indeterminate, if rit = q
i
t+1R.
(8)
If rit < q
i
t+1R, there exists a cutoff value 
i
t. The agents with j ≥ it can meet the MIR,
mij,t =
wit
ψit
(1 − θ)j ≥ mit, and are called entrepreneurs. Their total mass is τ it = (it)−
1
θ .
it is associated with the entrepreneur who just meets the MIR,
mij,t(
i
t) =
wit
ψit
(1− θ)it = m(Y it )1−σ, ⇒ it =
ψitF
(wit)
σ
, where F ≡ m
(1− α)1−σ(1− θ) .
6Matsuyama (2008) shows that the strategic default a la` Hart and Moore (1994) can give rise to this
form of the borrowing constraints.
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The constant size of population in each generation imposes a natural constraint on the
mass of entrepreneurs, i.e., τ it ≤ 1. Thus, the cutoff value is
it = max
{
1,
ψitF
(wit)
σ
}
. (9)
When young, entrepreneurs use the entire labor income, nij,t, and the loan b
i
j,t = n
i
j,t(
1
ψit
−1)
to finance their investment; when old, they consume, ci,ej,t+1, and exit from the economy,
nij,t = w
i
tlj and c
i,e
j,t+1 = n
i
j,tΩ
i
t. (10)
The agents with j ∈ [1, it) cannot meet the MIR and they are called households. Their
total mass is 1 − τ it = 1 − (it)−
1
θ . When young, households lend out their entire labor
income nij,t; when old, they consume, c
i,h
j,t+1, and exit from the economy,
nij,t = w
i
tlj and c
i,h
j,t+1 = n
i
j,tr
i
t. (11)
We analyze the equilibrium allocation under two scenarios: (1) autarky where agents
are allowed to borrow or lend domestically, (2) financial globalization where agents are
allowed to borrow or lend domestically as well as internationally.7
Let M it , D
i
t, and S
i
t denote the aggregate investment, the aggregate credit demand
and supply. Under autarky, the markets for capital goods and credit clear domestically,8
Kit+1 =
∫ ∞
it
Rmij,tdG(j) = RM
i
t , where M
i
t ≡
∫ ∞
it
mij,tdG(j), (12)
Dit ≡
∫ ∞
it
(mij,t − nij,t)dG(j), Sit ≡
∫ it
1
nij,tdG(j), D
i
t = S
i
t , ⇒ M it = wit. (13)
If rit = q
i
t+1R, those who can meet the MIR may not invest their entire labor income or
borrow to the limit. Despite the indeterminacy at the individual level, aggregate saving
is still fully used in the production of capital goods in equilibrium, Kit+1 = RM
i
t = Rw
i
t.
Definition 1. Under autarky, a market equilibrium in country i is a set of choices of
agents, {nij,t,mij,t, ci,ej,t, ci,hj,t , ψij,t}, the threshold value {it}, the prices {qit, wit,Ωit, rit}, and
the aggregate quantities {Y it , Kit ,M it}, satisfying equations (1)-(2), (6)-(13).
Under financial globalization, let φit denote the ratio of capital outflows over domestic
saving in country i, with negative values indicating the case of capital inflows. The
equilibrium conditions are identical as under autarky except for the domestic and world
credit market conditions,
M it = w
i
t(1− φit), (14)∫ 1
0
witφ
i
tdi = 0. (15)
7Following Matsuyama (2004), we exclude FDI flows by assumption. von Hagen and Zhang (2014a,b)
analyze the joint determination of financial capital flows and FDI flows in the setting without the MIR.
8According to the Walras’ law, the market for final goods clears in equilibrium.
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Definition 2. Under financial globalization, a market equilibrium in country i is a set of
choices of agents, {nij,t,mij,t, ci,ej,t, ci,hj,t , ψij,t}, the threshold value {it}, the prices {qit, wit,Ωit},
and the aggregate quantities {Y it , Kit ,M it , φit}, satisfying equations (1)-(2), (6)-(12), (14),
the interest rate is equalized across countries rit = r
∗
t and determined by equation (15).
3 Equilibrium under Autarky
Without loss of generality, we suppress the country index i for the scenario of autarky.
Let XA denote the steady-state value of variable Xt under autarky. Given the fixed
aggregate labor input L = 1, equation (2) implies that wt = (1− α)Yt. Thus, we use the
wage rate as a proxy for aggregate income in the following analysis.
Combine (12)-(13) to get Kt+1 = Rwt. Then, the law of motion for the wage rate
9 is
wt+1 =
(1− α)
L
Yt+1 =
(
Rwt
ρ
)α
, where ρ ≡ α
1− α. (16)
Proposition 1. Under autarky, there exists a unique, stable steady state in each country
where the wage rate is wA =
(
R
ρ
)ρ
.
Rewrite equation (16) into lnwt+1 − lnwt = (α − 1)(lnwt − lnwA). The decreasing
MPK (α < 1) acts as the convergence force that brings country i towards the steady state.
Although the MIR, financial frictions, and wealth inequality do not affect the dynamics
and the steady state under autarky in this model, they affect the interest rate response
to income changes, which may lead to multiple steady states under financial integration.
Interest Rate Response to Income Changes
Iff rt < qt+1R, the borrowing constraints are binding for all entrepreneurs and the interest
rate is a function of wt defined jointly by equations (17)-(18).
10
rt =
λ
1− ψt qt+1R =
λ
1− ψtw
−(1−α)
t R
αρ1−α, (17)
ψt =
(
wσt
F
)1−θ
. (18)
Iff rt = qt+1R, the borrowing constraints are slack and the interest rate is,
rt = qt+1R = w
−(1−α)
t R
αρ1−α. (19)
As mentioned in section 2, the zero spread rt = qt+1R leads to the indeterminacy of mj,t
and ψj,t. For analytical simplicity, we focus on an equilibrium where all entrepreneurs
still invest their entire labor income and choose the same ψt determined by equation (18).
Define Λ ≡ (1−α)(1−θ)
(1−λ)
1
1−θ
as an increasing function of λ ∈ (0, 1). Let ψ¯ ≡ 1− λ.
9Using the law of motion for wage simplifies our analysis. One can also use the law of motion for
capital, which, however, complicates the analysis.
10See the proof of lemma 1 in appendix C for derivation.
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Lemma 1. Iff m ≤ Y σt Λ, the borrowing constraints are slack and ψt ∈ (ψ¯, 1); iff m ≥
Y σt Λ, the borrowing constraints are binding and ψt ∈ (0, ψ¯].
If the borrowing constraints are slack, the interest rate declines in aggregate income,
due to the decreasing MPK. We call it the neoclassical effect. Use equation (19) to get
∂ ln rt
∂ lnwt
=
∂ ln qt+1R
∂ lnwt︸ ︷︷ ︸
the neoclassical effect
= α− 1 < 0. (20)
If the borrowing constraints are binding, the interest rate may rise in aggregate income.
We derive the relevant conditions by analyzing the credit market equilibrium.
Use equations (3) and (13) to rewrite the aggregate credit demand and supply as
Dt =
λqt+1R
rt
Mt =
λqt+1R
rt
wt and St = wt[1− −(
1
θ
−1)
t ], which are affected by various factors,
lnDt = lnwt︸︷︷︸
net-wealth effect
+ ln qt+1R︸ ︷︷ ︸
neoclassical effect
+ lnλ︸︷︷︸
financial-development effect
− ln rt︸︷︷︸
interest-rate effect
(21)
lnSt = lnwt︸︷︷︸
net-wealth effect
+ ln(1− τ 1−θt )︸ ︷︷ ︸
supply-side extensive-margin effect
. (22)
According to equation (21), the present value of the entrepreneurs’ pledgeable investment
return declines in the interest rate and hence, the credit demand curve is downward
sloping, ∂Dt
∂rt
< 0; according to equation (22), since households supply their entire labor
income inelastically to the credit market, the credit supply curve is vertical ∂St
∂rt
= 0.
Besides, the aggregate credit demand and supply are affected by the following factors.
• The net-wealth effect: the higher the aggregate income, the higher the agents’ labor
income and net wealth, the higher the aggregate credit demand and supply.
• The neoclassical effect: the higher the aggregate investment in period t, the lower
the MPK in period t + 1, the lower the unit pledgeable value of entrepreneurs’
investment in period t, the lower the aggregate credit demand.
• The financial-development effect: the higher the level of financial development, the
more funds entrepreneurs can borrow, the higher the aggregate credit demand.
• The supply-side extensive-margin effect: the larger the mass of households 1 − τt,
the higher the aggregate credit supply.
Figure 2 shows the credit market equilibrium under autarky. The downward-sloping
credit demand curve Dt and the vertical credit supply curve St intersect at point E with
the equilibrium interest rate rt. If aggregate income rises marginally from Yt to Y˜t, the
aggregate saving rises proportionally from wt = (1− α)Yt to w˜t = (1− α)Y˜t.
Combine equations (9) and (13) to get
τt = 
− 1
θ
t =
wσt
F
, and
∂ ln τt
∂ lnwt
= σ. (23)
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Figure 2: Credit Market Response to An Increase in Aggregate Income
For σ = 0, a rise in Yt raises the MIR mt = mYt and the net wealth of individual
agents nj,t = ljwt = lj(1−α)Yt in the equal proportions. According to equation (23), the
cutoff value is constant at t = A ≡ Fθ and so is the mass of entrepreneurs τt = τA ≡ 1F .
Thus, the aggregate credit demand and supply respond only on the intensive margin.
According to equations (21) and (22), the net-wealth effect raises the credit supply and
demand in the equal proportions, while the neoclassical effect reduces the credit demand.
As shown in the left panel of figure 2, the rightward shift of the credit demand curve is
dominated by that of the credit supply curve and the credit market equilibrium moves
from point E to E˜ with a lower interest rate r˜t < rt. In this case, the interest rate is
purely driven by the neoclassical effect,
∂ lnDt
∂ lnwt
= 1 +
∂ ln qt+1R
∂ lnwt
− ∂ ln rt
∂ lnwt
, and
∂ lnSt
∂ lnwt
= 1,
∂ lnDt
∂ lnwt
=
∂ lnSt
∂ lnwt
, ⇒ ∂ ln rt
∂ lnwt
=
∂ ln qt+1R
∂ lnwt︸ ︷︷ ︸
the neoclassical effect
= α− 1 < 0. (24)
For σ = 1, the MIR is constant at mt = m and a rise in Yt raises the net wealth of
individual agents so that more agents can meet the MIR and become entrepreneurs, i.e.,
∂ ln τt
∂ lnwt
= σ > 0, according to equation (23). Thus, the aggregate credit demand and supply
respond on the intensive and the extensive margins. In particular, the decline in
the mass of households reduces the credit supply on the extensive margin, which tends
to raise the interest rate. Use equations (21)-(23) to get
∂ ln rt
∂ lnwt
=
∂ ln qt+1R
∂ lnwt︸ ︷︷ ︸
the neoclassical effect
−∂ ln(1− τ
1−θ
t )
∂ ln τt
∂ ln τt
∂ lnwt︸ ︷︷ ︸
the extensive-margin effect
= (α− 1) + 1− θ1
ψt
− 1 . (25)
If the extensive-margin effect dominates the neoclassical effect, the rightward shift of the
credit supply curve is dominated by that of the credit demand curve and, as shown in
the right panel of figure 2, the credit market equilibrium moves from point E to E˜ with
a higher interest rate, r˜t > rt. Let ψ˜A ≡ 1−α1−α+1−θ and λ˜A ≡ 1− ψ˜A.
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Lemma 2. For σ = 0, the interest rate declines in aggregate income under autarky.
For σ = 1, the interest rate rises in aggregate income under autarky, iff λ ∈ (0, λ˜A)
and wt ∈ (Fψ˜
1
1−θ
A ,Fψ¯
1
1−θ ) or equivalently ψt =
(
wt
F
)1−θ ∈ (ψ˜A, ψ¯).11
O
1
1
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Figure 3: Interest Rate Response to Income Changes: σ = 1
Given σ = 1, the left panel of figure 3 shows lemma 2 in the {λ, ψt} space. In
equilibrium, ψt =
(
wt
F
)1−θ
=
[
Kαt
(Lρ)αF
]1−θ
and one can convert the threshold values from
the {λ, ψt} space to the {λ,Kt} space, as shown in the right panel. For (λ, ψt) in region
SD, the borrowing constraints are s lack and, due to the neoclassical effect, the interest
rate declines in aggregate income; for (λ, ψt) in region BI (BD), the borrowing constraints
are binding and the interest rate increases (declines) in aggregate income, because the
extensive-margin effect dominates (is dominated by) the neoclassical effect.
Figure 4 shows proposition 1 and lemma 2 graphically. In the left panel, the law
of motion for wage under autarky crosses the 45◦ line once and only once from the left
at point S with the wage rate wA. In the middle panel, for σ = 0, the interest rate is
proportional to the marginal rate of return to investment and, due to the neoclassical
effect, they decline in wt. In the right panel, for σ = 1 and λ ∈ (0, λ˜A), the extensive-
margin effect interacts with the neoclassical effect so that the interest rate is a non-
monotonic function of wt.
Combine equations (16) and (18) to get,
ψA =
[wA
m
(1− θ)
]1−θ
=
[(
R
ρ
)ρ
(1− θ)
m
]1−θ
. (26)
11As long as the aggregate production function has the decreasing MPK, i.e., f ′(k) > 0 and f ′′(k) < 0,
where k ≡ KL , the neoclassical effect and the extensive-margin effect exist in the presence of the constant
MIR and the binding borrowing constraints. Thus, our assumption of the Cobb-Douglas production
function is not essential for the positive interest rate response to income changes.
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Figure 4: Wage Dynamics and Interest Rate Pattern
Thus, the steady-state value ψA is a function of the model parameters {R,m, ρ, θ}. If the
parameter values are chosen in such a way that ψA < ψ¯, the borrowing constraints are
binding at the steady state. Evaluate equation (25) at the steady state,
∂ ln rt
∂ lnwt
||wt=wA = α− 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
the neoclassical effect (-)
+
(1− θ)
1
ψA
− 1 .︸ ︷︷ ︸
the extensive-margin effect (+)
. (27)
Five factors affect the interest rate response to income changes around the steady state.
• The higher the α, the weaker the neoclassical effect.
• The lower the λ, the more likely the borrowing constraints are binding at the
autarkic steady state (ψA < 1−λ) and the extensive-margin effect in equation (27)
is active.12 Given ψA < 1− λ,
– The lower the θ, the smaller the within-country wealth inequality, the stronger
the extensive-margin effect.
– The higher the productivity measured by R or the lower the MIR measured
by m, the larger the mass of entrepreneurs and the ψA, the smaller the mass
of households, the stronger the extensive-margin effect.
If ψA = ψh ∈ (ψ¯, 1) or ψA = ψl ∈ (0, ψ˜A), i.e., in region SD or BD of figure 3, the interest
rate declines in wt around the steady state; if ψA = ψm ∈ (ψ˜A, ψ¯), i.e., in region BI, the
interest rate rises in wt around the steady state. See the right panel of figure 4.
4 Equilibrium under Financial Globalization
We use the term “financial integration” from an individual country’s perspective and
refer to the case where country i is integrated into the world financial market and its
12If ψA > 1− λ, the borrowing constraints are slack at the autarkic steady state where the extensive-
margin effect is absent and the interest rate strictly declines in aggregate income.
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domestic interest rate is then equal to the world level. We use the term “financial glob-
alization” from the world economy’s perspective and refer to the case where all countries
are financially integrated and the world interest rate is endogenously determined.
Suppose that country i allows financial integration from period t = 0 on, given the
world interest rate rit = r
∗. Without loss of generality, we assume r∗ = rA, where
rA =
λ
1−ψAρ (rA = ρ) if the borrowing constraints are binding (slack) in the autarkic
steady state. Under financial globalization, the autarkic steady state is still a steady
state, but it may not be stable or unique.
There exists a threshold value w¯F such that for w
i
t > w¯F , the borrowing constraints
are slack, Rqit+1 = r
∗, so that the law of motion for wage is flat at wit+1 = wA
(
ρ
r∗
)ρ
; for
wit < w¯F , the borrowing constraints are binding, ψ
i
t < 1− λ, and
rit =
λ
1− ψit
Rqit+1 = r
∗, ⇒ wit+1 = wA
[
λ
(1− ψit)
ρ
r∗
]ρ
. (28)
Under autarky, domestic investment is fully financed by domestic saving,
Kit+1
R
= wit and
equation (16) specifies the law of motion for wage, regardless of whether the mass-of-
entrepreneurs constraint is binding or not. Under financial integration, domestic invest-
ment depends on domestic saving and financial capital flows,
Kit+1
R
= wit(1− φit); whether
the mass-of-entrepreneurs constraint is binding or not matters for the patterns of capital
flows and domestic investment, which affects the law of motion for wage.13
• If the mass-of-entrepreneurs constraint is slack, τt < 1, the law of motion for wage
in country i are characterized by equations (28) and (29),
wit = (ψ
i
tF
1−θ)
1
σ(1−θ)+θ
{[
λρ
r∗(1− ψit)
] 1
1−α
wA
} θ
σ(1−θ)+θ
; (29)
• if the mass-of-entrepreneurs constraint is binding, τt = 1, the law of motion for
wage in country i are characterized by equations (28) and (30),
wit = ψ
i
t
[
λρ
r∗(1− ψit)
] 1
1−α
wA. (30)
As shown below, multiple steady states may arise in country i under financial integration,
if the response of the autarkic interest rate to income changes is positive and strong
enough. It depends on the form of the MIR, the dispersion of within-country wealth
distribution, the borrowing constraints, and the mass-of-entrepreneurs constraint.
13By explicitly taking into account the mass-of-entrepreneurs constraint, we correct an error in figure
5 of Matsuyama (2004). See the proof of Proposition 3 for the derivation of equations (28)-(30) and the
threshold conditions for the borrowing constraints and the mass-of-entrepreneurs constraint.
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4.1 Dynamic and Steady-State Analysis: the Case of σ = 0
According to lemma 2, in the case of σ = 0, the autarkic interest rate declines in aggregate
income, due to the neoclassical effect. Given r∗ = rA, if country i is initially above the
autarkic steady state Y i0 > YA, its autarkic interest rate is lower than the world level,
ri0 < r
∗. From period t = 0 on, country i witnesses financial capital outflows, which
makes its current domestic investment and next-period aggregate income lower than
under autarky. The opposite applies to the case of Y i0 < YA. The solid (dashed) curve
in figure 5 shows the law of motion for wage under financial integration (autarky). The
left (right) panel shows the case where the borrowing constraints are binding (slack) in
the steady state.14 Due to the investment-dampening effect, the law of motion for wage
around the autarkic steady state is flatter under financial integration than under autarky.
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Figure 5: Laws of Motion for Wage: the Case σ = 0
Proposition 2. In the case of σ = 0, the autarkic steady state is still the unique, stable
steady state under financial integration.
Under financial integration, besides the decreasing MPK, the investment-dampening
effect acts as another convergence force that brings country i towards the autarkic steady
state. The investment-dampening effect results ultimately from the negative interest rate
response to income changes under autarky in the case of σ = 0.
Consider a world economy where countries are inherently identical except for the
initial income. Under autarky, there is a unique, symmetric, stable steady state where
all countries reach the same income level in the long run, regardless of their initial in-
come levels. Financial globalization does not change the uniqueness and stability of this
symmetric steady state in the world economy.
14The detailed analysis and the proof of proposition 2 are included in the proof of proposition 3.
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4.2 Dynamic and Steady-State Analysis: the Case of σ = 1
According to lemma 2, in the case of the constant MIR σ = 1, the autarkic interest rate
increases in aggregate income, if the extensive-margin effect dominates the neoclassical
effect. In contrast to the case of σ = 0, financial integration may generate the investment-
amplification effect, which act as a divergence force and compete with the decreasing
MPK, leading to multiple steady states in country i. The factors that can reinforce the
positive interest rate response to income changes under autarky may raise the possibility
of multiple steady states under financial integration.
Proposition 3. In the case of σ = 1, let λˆF ≡ α−θ1−θ . Under financial integration, if θ < α
and λ ∈ (0, λˆF ), multiple steady states may arise for an individual country; otherwise,
the autarkic steady state is still the unique, stable steady state.
Wealth Inequality and the Possibility of Symmetry Breaking
Figure 6 shows proposition 3 in the {λ, θ} space and the solid curve shows the threshold
value λˆF as the function of θ. For parameters in region U, the autarkic steady state is
still the unique, stable steady state under financial integration; for parameters in region
M, financial integration may lead to multiple steady states for an individual country so
that financial globalization may “break” the symmetric steady state under autarky and
lead to income polarization in the world economy, as shown later.
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Figure 6: Possibility of Multiple Steady States in the {λ, θ} Space: σ = 1
Before exploring the mechanism behind the multiple steady states, we compare our
results with Matsuyama (2004). In his model, agents have the homogeneous labor en-
dowment so that their labor income is homogeneous and so is their wealth. His model is
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technically a limiting case of ours with θ → 0.15 According to proposition 3 and figure 6,
a necessary condition for symmetry breaking in his model is λ < α,16 implying that the
level of financial development is a key determinant for symmetry breaking.
In our model, the larger the θ, the greater the wealth inequality, the weaker the
extensive-margin effect on the credit market, the less likely the autarkic interest rate is
higher in the rich than in the poor country,17 the less likely financial globalization leads
to ”uphill” financial capital flows from the poor to the rich country, the less likely the
cross-country income polarization. According to proposition 3 and figure 6,
• for θ ∈ (0, α), a rise in wealth inequality reduces the possibility of symmetry break-
ing through the threshold value λˆF ;
• for θ ∈ (α, 1), symmetry breaking does not arise at all, regardless of the level of
financial development.
Thus, our result suggests that wealth inequality is as crucial as financial development in
affecting the consequences of financial globalization.18
Exploring the Mechanism of Symmetry Breaking
Let us focus on the case of θ < α where multiple steady states may arise. Define a
composite parameter Z ≡ R
ρ
(
1−θ
m
) 1
ρ . The left (right) panel of figure 7 shows the parameter
configuration for multiple steady states under financial integration in the {λ, ψA} ({λ, Z})
space.19 The dashed line in the left panel shows the threshold value ψ˜A defined in lemma
2. The solid (dash) curves in figure 8 show the laws of motion for wage under financial
integration (autarky), with the parameters in the five regions of figure 7, respectively.
Consider the parameters in region B of figure 7. According to the upper-left panel
of figure 8, financial integration destabilizes the autarkic steady state S in the sense
15See the proofs of propositions 3 and 6 in appendix.
16Suppose that the production function in his model is Cobb-Douglas with α as the capital share.
17See the discussion at the end of section 3.
18In our model, α represents the capital share in the Cobb-Douglas production function and the wealth
distribution is Pareto with the tail index 1θ and the Gini coefficient
1
2
θ−1
. Our model is highly stylized
and not suitable for calibration. However, one can still infer θ using the Gini coefficients from the World
Bank database and compare it with the conventional value for α to get a sense about whether multiple
steady states are possible at all.
19According to equation (26), ψA = Z
ρ(1−θ) is a function of the model parameters and one can convert
the boundary conditions from the {λ, ψA} space (the left panel) to the {λ, Z} space (the right panel).
Matsuyama (2004) normalizes the FIR at unity and shows with figure 5 the parameter configuration in
the {λ,R} space. Then, he analyzes the impact of the productivity, R, on symmetry breaking. In our
model, we introduce m as a free parameter for the MIR. Technically, both R and m matter for symmetry
breaking. If the various combinations of R and m give the same value of Z, ψA is unaffected and so are
the boundary conditions in the {λ, ψA} and {λ, Z} spaces. One can map the diagram from the {λ, Z}
space to the {λ,R} space or to the {λ,m} space to analyze the impacts of R or m, respectively.
Matsuyama’s model is a limiting case of ours. With σ = 1 and θ → 0, the right panel of figure 15
coincides with figure 5 in Matsuyama (2004). See appendix A and the proofs of propositions 3 and 6.
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Figure 7: Parameter Configurations for Multiple Steady States: σ = 1 and θ < α
that, with the initial income higher (lower) than in the autarkic steady state wi0 > wA
(wi0 < wA), country i converges to the steady state H (L) with wH > wA (wL < wA).
Intuitively, for the parameters in region BI of figure 3, if aggregate income in country
i is initially higher than in the autarkic steady state Y i0 > YA, the autarkic interest rate
is higher than the world level ri0 > r
∗, given r∗ = rA. In period t = 0, country i witnesses
financial capital inflows, which makes the current domestic investment and next-period
aggregate income higher than under autarky. The opposite applies to the case of Y i0 < YA.
Thus, due to the investment-amplification effect, the law of motion for wage around the
autarkic steady state is steeper under financial integration than under autarky.
Given Y i0 and YA, the larger the interest rate response to income changes around the
autarkic steady state, the larger the interest rate deviation from the world level, the
larger the magnitude of financial capital flows, the stronger the investment-amplification
effect. As shown at the end of section 3, given the borrowing constraints are binding
at the autarkic steady state, the larger the ψt, the larger the extensive-margin effect,
the larger the positive interest rate response to income changes at the autarkic steady
state. Thus, for the parameters in region B of figure 7, the interest rate response to
income changes at the autarkic steady state is positive and sufficiently strong so that the
investment-amplification effect dominates the decreasing MPK and hence, the autarkic
steady state becomes unstable under financial integration.
Financial capital inflows in period t = 0 lead to higher aggregate income in period
t = 1, which allows more agents to meet the MIR and become entrepreneurs. As long as
the borrowing constraints are binding and the mass-of-entrepreneurs constraint is slack
τ it < 1, the extensive-margin effect dominates the neoclassical effect so that the interest
rate tends to rise in country i, which further attracts financial capital inflows in pe-
riod t = 1. This way, financial capital flows become dynamically self-reinforcing, which
magnifies the investment-amplification effect over time. This dynamic self-reinforcing
18
wA wHwL wt
wt+1 S
L
H
O
Case B
wA wHwM wt
wt+1 S
M
H
O
Case AB
S
wAwM
wL wt
wt+1
L
M
O
Case BC
S
wA wtO
wt+1
Case A
S
wA wt
wt+1
O
Case C
Figure 8: Laws of Motion for Wage: σ = 1 and θ < α
process goes on until either the borrowing constraints become slack or the mass-of-
entrepreneurs constraint becomes binding. Here, the extensive-margin channel is critical
to the investment-amplification effect in the short run and in the long run.
Start with region B of figure 7. Let us raise m so that ψA declines and the parameter
configuration moves into region AB. The interest rate response to income changes at
the autarkic steady state is positive but small. Thus, the decreasing MPK dominates
the investment-amplification effect so that the autarkic steady state is still locally stable
under financial integration. However, for wit  wA, ψit enters into the upper part of
region BI of figure 3 where the interest rate response to income changes is positive and
strong. Then, financial integration affects domestic investment and aggregate income in
the same way as for case B. The upper-middle panel of figure 8 shows that, besides the
stable steady state S, financial integration leads to another stable steady state H and an
unstable steady state M with wH > wM > wA.
Start with region B of figure 7. Let us reduce m so that ψA rises and the parameter
configuration moves into region BC where the borrowing constraints are slack and the
interest rate declines in aggregate income at the steady state under autarky. Given
r∗ = rA = ρ, financial integration makes the law of motion for wage flat at the autarkic
steady state and hence, the autarkic steady state is still locally stable. However, for
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wit  wA, ψit enters into region BI of figure 3 where the interest rate responds positively
to income changes. Then, financial integration affects domestic investment and aggregate
income in the same way as for case B. The upper-right panel of figure 8 shows that, besides
the stable steady state S, financial integration leads to another stable steady state L and
an unstable steady state M with wL < wM < wA.
For the parameters in region A and C of figure 7, financial integration does not lead
to multiple steady states. See the lower panels of figure 8.
To sum up, in the case of σ = 1, the positive interest rate response to income changes
under autarky is key to the rise of multiple steady states under financial integration. As
shown in section 3, five factors affect the response of the autarkic interest rate to income
changes, which explains intuitively the threshold conditions specified in proposition 3.
Although the initial income level does not matter for the dynamic patterns and the
steady state in country i under autarky, it may matter under financial integration. For
example, in case B, starting with the income level slightly higher (lower) than that in the
autarkic steady state, the small open economy converges to a new, stable steady state
with the income level much higher (lower) than in the autarkic steady state; in case AB
(BC), starting with the income level sufficiently higher (lower) than that in the autarkic
steady state, the small open economy converges to a new, stable steady state with the
income level much higher (lower) than in the autarkic steady state.
Incorporate this mechanism into a world economy where all countries are inherently
identical. For the parameters in region B of figure 7, the world economy has a unique,
stable, symmetric steady state under autarky where all countries reach the same income
level in the long run, regardless of their initial income levels; financial globalization may
destabilize this symmetric steady state and lead to the asymmetric, stable steady state
where initially rich (poor) countries have the income higher (lower) than in the autarkic
steady state. Matsuyama (2004) calls this result “symmetry breaking”.
5 Heterogeneity in Financial Development
So far, we have assumed that countries are inherently identical except for the initial
income so as to highlight the mechanism behind “symmetry breaking”. Needless to say,
countries differ in various aspects, e.g., endowments, technologies, institutions, etc. In
this section, we introduce the cross-country heterogeneity in financial development20 and
address three issues for a small open economy, i.e., the threshold conditions for financial
integration, domestic financial crises and capital controls, and the world interest rate
shocks and economic volatility.
We conduct our analysis in a two-country setting of the constant MIR (σ = 1). The
world consists of country S (small) and country W (the rest of world) which are inherently
20Alternatively, one can also introduce the cross-country heterogeneity in wealth inequality and analyze
the implications of financial integration.
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identical except for the level of financial development, λS 6= λW , and the population size,
LS  LW . Suppose that country W allows free mobility of financial capital and is initially
in the steady state. Given its negligible population size in the world economy, country
S takes the world interest rate as given, r∗t = r
W
A . Note that ψA is a function of the
parameters {R, ρ, θ,m}, identical in the two countries.
Define ΛW ≡ (1−α)(1−θ)
(1−λW )
1
1−θ
as a function of λW ∈ (0, 1) and ∂ΛW
∂λW
> 0.
Corollary 1. Under autarky, if m >
(Rρ )
ρ
1−α Λ
W , the borrowing constraints in country W
are binding in the steady state with ψA ∈ (0, 1− λW ) and rWA = λ
W
1−ψAρ < ρ.
For λS ∈ (0, 1−ψA), the borrowing constraints in country S are binding in the autarkic
steady state with rSA =
λS
1−ψAρ < ρ; for λ
S ∈ (1 − ψA, 1), the borrowing constraints in
country S are slack in the autarkic steady state with rSA = ρ.
We focus on the case where the parameters for country W is in region B of figure 7.
5.1 Threshold Conditions for Financial Integration
A country will choose to be financially integrated if and only if it is beneficial.21 The
condition of financial integration can be quite different for those financially developed
versus those financially underdeveloped countries.
As shown in subsection 4.2, for financially developed countries (i.e., λ > λˆF ), financial
integration does not lead to symmetry breaking and it may speed up the convergence for
an individual country to the autarkic steady state. Thus, these countries are more likely
to have the integrated financial markets.
In the following, we focus on the financially underdeveloped countries.
Proposition 4. Given (λW , ψA) in region B of figure 7,
22 there are two threshold values,
λS < λW and λ¯S > λW .
• For λS < λS, financial integration induces country S to converge to a unique steady
state with aggregate income lower than under autarky;
• for λS ∈ (λS, λ¯S), financial integration leads to multiple steady states for country S.
Let w˜S denote the wage rate in the unstable steady state. Financial integration in-
duces country S to converge to the steady state with aggregate income higher (lower)
than under autarky, iff its initial income is sufficiently high (low), i.e., wS0 > w˜
S
(wS0 < w˜
S);
• for λS > λ¯S, financial integration induces country S to converge to a unique steady
state with aggregate income higher than under autarky.
21For simplicity, the per capita income is used here as a measure of welfare. For a formal welfare
analysis, one needs to take into account the distributional effects on entrepreneurs and on households,
respectively.
22By the same logic, one can also analyze the cases with (λW , ψA) in the other four regions.
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Figure 9: Impacts of Financial Integration: the Case of σ = 1
Let us start with the case of λS > λW . The dashed curve in the left panel of figure
9 shows the law of motion for wage in country S under autarky. If country S is initially
at the autarkic steady state Y S0 = YA, the interest rate is higher in country S than in
country W, rSA = min{ λ
S
1−ψAρ, ρ} > rWA = λ
W
1−ψAρ, due to the financial-development effect.
From period t = 0 on, country S receives financial capital inflows, which raises its current
domestic investment and next-period aggregate income. According to the mechanism
described in subsection 4.2, the investment-amplification effect dominates the decreasing
MPK so that aggregate income in country S rises over time until country S reaches the
new steady state. According to proposition 4,
• if λS is significantly higher than λW , i.e., λS > λ¯S, the law of motion for wage
under financial integration is shown by the thick curve in the left panel of figure
9. Regardless of the initial income level, country S converges to the unique steady
state H with the income much higher than under autarky.
• If λS is slightly higher than λW , i.e., λS ∈ (λW , λ¯S), the law of motion for wage
under financial integration is shown by the thin curve in the left panel of figure
9. If its initial income level is relatively low (high) wS0 < w˜
S (wS0 > w˜
S), country
S converges to the steady state L (H) with the income much lower (higher) than
under autarky. The higher the λS, the lower the threshold value w˜S.
The analysis for the case of λS < λW is analogue to the previous one. According to
proposition 4,
• if λS is significantly lower than λW , i.e., λS < λS, the law of motion for wage
under financial integration is shown by the thick curve in the right panel of figure
9. Regardless of the initial income level, country S converges to the unique steady
state L’ with the income much lower than under autarky.
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• If λS is slightly lower than λW , i.e., λS ∈ (λS, λW ), the law of motion for wage
under financial integration is shown by the thin curve in the right panel of figure
9. If its initial income level is relatively low (high) wS0 < w˜
S (wS0 > w˜
S), country
S converges to the steady state L (H) with the income much lower (higher) than
under autarky. The higher the λS, the lower the threshold value w˜S.
Proposition 4 essentially provides the threshold conditions for financial integration: a
country should (should not) allow financial integration if its level of financial development
is far above (below) the world level; in the intermediate case, the initial income matters
and, the higher the level of financial development, the lower the threshold value for
the initial income, i.e., w˜S. Thus, whether a country should allow financial integration
depends on its level of financial development relative to the rest of the world (country
W) and possibly on its initial income level.
In order to highlight the extensive-margin effect due to the constant MIR and financial
frictions, we conduct a parallel analysis in the setting where the project is not subject to
the MIR. See appendix A.4.1. In that setting, aggregate investment only takes place on
the intensive margin and the autarkic interest rate strictly declines in aggregate income.
Thus, financial integration does not lead to multiple steady states and the steady-state
income effect is much smaller than in the setting of the constant MIR σ = 1.
Kose, Prasad, Rogoff, and Wei (2009, 2010) and Kose, Prasad, and Taylor (2011)
provide the empirical evidences that financial integration leads to better macroeconomic
outcomes when certain threshold conditions are met. The extent of financial sector
development is one of their threshold conditions and hence, our model predictions are
consistent with their findings.
As shown above, the condition of financial integration is quite different for those
financially developed versus those financially underdeveloped countries. It is consistent
with the fact that the developed countries which have the well-developed financial sector,
e.g., the OECD countries, usually promote capital account liberalization at the global
level, while emerging economies which have the underdeveloped financial sector, e.g.,
China and India, are rather conservative on this issue.
5.2 Domestic Financial Crises and Capital Controls
In this subsection, we feature a domestic financial crisis in country S by a decline in its
level of financial development from λS1 to λ
S
2 in period t = 0 and analyze its short-run
and the long-run impacts as well as discuss the conditions for capital controls.
Under autarky, as domestic saving is fully used to produce capital goods, the decline
in the level of financial development in country S does not affect the law of motion for
wage, as shown by the dashed curve in figure 10.
Consider the equilibrium under financial integration in the scenario of λS1 ∈ (λS, λ¯S).
The thin curve in the left panel of figure 10 shows the law of motion for wage before
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Figure 10: Impacts of Domestic Financial Crisis: the Case of σ = 1
period t = 0. Suppose that country S is initially in the steady state H with wS0 = wH .
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A decline in λS shifts the law of motion for wage to the right and the impacts on aggregate
dynamics and on the steady state depends on its magnitude and duration.
• For a small decline, i.e., λS2 ∈ (λS, λS1 ), the law of motion for wage shifts slightly to
the right and point H is still a stable steady state. Since the equilibrium allocation
is unaffect in this scenario, it is not considered as a financial crisis.
• For a large decline, i.e., λS2 < λS, the law of motion for wage shifts significantly to
the right so that point H is no long a steady state, as shown by the thick curve.
Intuitively, the tightened borrowing constraints depress the domestic credit demand
and the interest rate declines, which triggers financial capital outflows and the fall
in domestic investment. This scenario can be considered as a financial crisis.
– If λS falls temporarily and then quickly returns to its initial level before wSt
falls below w˜S, country S eventually returns to its initial steady state H.
– For a prolonged decline in λS, country S eventually converges to the steady
state L’. In that case, even if λS returns to the pre-crisis level, country S is
trapped in the steady state L with the income lower than under autarky.
Consider the equilibrium under financial integration in the scenario of λS1 > λ¯
S.24 The
thin curve in the right panel of figure 10 shows the law of motion for wage before period
t = 0. Suppose that country S is initially in the steady state H, wS0 = wH . Similar as
23According Proposition 4, for λS1 ∈ (λS , λ¯S), if the initial income in country S is below a threshold,
financial integration induces country S to converge to the steady state L with the income lower than
under autarky. In that case, country S should choose autarky.
24According Proposition 4, for λS1 < λ
S , financial integration reduces the steady-state aggregate income
in country S and hence, country S optimally chooses autarky.
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in the previous case, the impacts of a decline in λS on aggregate dynamics and on the
steady state depends on its magnitude and duration; different from the previous case,
even for a large and prolonged decline in λS, country S can always return to the initial
steady state H when λS returns to its pre-crisis level.
To sum up, for a mild and temporary disruption in the domestic financial market,
country S does not need to impose capital controls, because the economy can recover to
its initial level when the financial sector resumes its functions. However, in the case of
a severe and prolonged domestic financial crisis, the less financially developed countries
should impose capital controls to avoid the economy to be trapped in a low-income steady
state, while the more financially developed countries do not need to do so. Intuitively, the
existence of multiple steady states creates path dependence so that the timing and the size
of policy interventions are critical for the less financially developed country to recover from
domestic financial crises. Recently, the International Monetary Fund (hereafter, IMF)
endorsed a new “institutional view” on capital account liberalization and the management
of capital flows (IMF, 2012a,b, 2015). Capital outflow management measures can be
introduced temporarily in crisis situations or when a crisis may be imminent. Our results
are consistent with the IMF’s position.
5.3 World Interest Rate Shocks and Economic Volatility
So far, we have assumed that country W is in the steady state and the world interest
rate is constant at r∗t = r
W
A . Suppose that country W is hit by a financial crisis in period
t = 0 on and its level of financial development falls from λW1 to λ
W
2 . Accordingly, the
interest rate in country W falls gradually from rW1 =
λW1 ρ
1−ψW to r
W
2 =
λW2 ρ
1−ψW and so does
the world interest rate. As shown below, the impacts of the world interest rate shock on
country S depend on λS and the size of the world interest rate change. Note that λ¯S and
λS refer to the two threshold values defined in proposition 4, where λ¯S > λW1 > λ
S.25
• For λS > λ¯S, the thin (thick) curve in the left panel of figure 11 shows the law of
motion for wage in country S under financial integration before (after) period t = 0.
Before period t = 0, country S optimally chooses to allow financial integration,
according to proposition 4. Suppose that country S is initially in the steady state
with the wage rate wH = wA
(
ρ
rW1
)ρ
= wA
(
1−ψW
λW1
)ρ
> wA. From period t = 0 on,
the decline in the world interest rate allows country S to further receive financial
capital inflows and it eventually converges to a new steady state H’ with wH′ =
wA
(
ρ
rW2
)ρ
= wA
(
1−ψW
λW2
)ρ
.
• For λS < λS, the thin (thick) curve in the right panel of figure 11 shows the law
of motion for wage in country S under financial integration before (after) period
t = 0. Before period t = 0, country S optimally chooses autarky, according to
25As shown in the proof of proposition 4, the two threshold values are the functions of λW . In this
subsection, we use λW1 to compute the two threshold values.
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Figure 11: Impacts of the World Interest Rate Change: the Case of σ = 1
proposition 4. Suppose that country S is initially in the steady state with the wage
rate wA. From period t = 0 on, if the world interest rate falls below the domestic
interest rate in country S rW2 < r
S
A or equivalently λ
W
2 < λ
S, country S optimally
chooses financial integration and it eventually converges to a new steady state H
with wH = wA
(
ρ
rW2
)ρ
= wA
(
1−ψW
λW2
)ρ
.
Suppose that the level of financial development in country W gradually returns to its
initial level λW1 and the world interest rate also rises to its initial level r
W
1 . By the same
logic as mentioned above, the wage rate in the more financially developed country (i.e.,
λS > λ¯S) declines from wH′ to wH and so does the aggregate income; the wage rate in
the less financially developed country (i.e., λS < λS) declines from wH to wL if it does
not restrict financial capital flows or from wH to wA if it imposes capital controls again.
To sum up, the world interest rate shocks generate a larger income volatility in the less
financially developed country than in the more financially developed country. This is
consistent with our observations of financial capital flows for emerging economies in the
period of quantitative easing as well as in the post-QE period.
6 Final Remarks
In the literature, finance plays a central role in theories of wealth inequality (Aghion
and Bolton, 1997; Banerjee and Newman, 1993; Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2009; Galor
and Moav, 2004; Galor and Zeira, 1993; Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990). The empirical
evidence is fairly robust that financial development improves the distribution of income
and especially the incomes of the poor (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine, 2007; Burgess
and Pande, 2005). Meanwhile, recent evidence suggests that poor access to finance not
only reflects economic constraints but also barriers erected by insiders. Inequality affects
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the distribution of political influence, so financial regulation often is easily captured by
established interests in unequal countries (Claessens and Perotti, 2007; Demirguc-Kunt
and Levine, 2009). In our paper, both the degree of wealth inequality and the level of
financial development are exogenous26, which allows us to isolate their respective impacts
on symmetry breaking and obtain the analytical results. Our current findings suggest that
the higher the wealth inequality and/or the higher the level of financial development, the
less likely the symmetry breaking. Allowing financial development and wealth distribution
to be jointly determined may have profound implications for symmetry breaking.
In this paper, we analyze how wealth inequality may reshape the consequences of
financial globalization. Jaumotte, Lall, and Papageorgiou (2013) show that financial
globalization is associated with a rise in inequality. Another possible extension of the
current paper is to study how the dynamic interactions between wealth distribution and
financial globalization may reshape the mechanism of symmetry breaking.27
As is well known, the financial sectors not only promote economic growth and de-
velopment (Buera, Kaboski, and Shin, 2011; King and Levine, 1993; Levine, Loayza,
and Beck, 2000) but also evolve endogenously along the process of economic develop-
ment (Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 1997; Laeven, Levine, and Michalopoulos, 2015; Song and
Thakor, 2010). In general, the financial sectors are more efficient in the rich than in the
poor countries. In appendix B.1, we introduce into our model the endogeneity of financial
and economic development in a parsimonious way and its impacts on symmetry breaking
are ambiguous. For future research, we plan to investigate how economic development
may reshape the financial sector and then affect the symmetry breaking mechanism.
Our results suggest that countries should improve their financial sectors so as to reap
the benefits from financial integration. However, should a country improve its financial
sector before liberalizing its capital account or should it use capital account liberalization
as a commitment device to stimulate the domestic financial intermediaries to improve
their services? In order to answer this question, one must explicitly characterize the
incentive structures of the financial intermediaries and investigate how they respond
to financial integration. According to Alessandria and Qian (2005) and Tressel and
Verdier (2011), financial integration may improve or worsen the efficiency of financial
intermediaries, leading to an improvement or worsening of the aggregate composition
of investment projects. In particular, their results depend critically on the institutional
environment. Thus, it requires a more fundamental approach from the political economy
perspective if one wants to analyze whether and how financial openness may trigger the
changes in the institutional environment. We keep them for future research.
26In our model, the labor income is the only source of the net wealth of young agents. Thus, their
wealth distribution is identical as their labor income distribution, which is purely determined by the
exogenous labor endowment distribution.
27One can extend our model into a three-period setting where agents can accumulate wealth over time
and then analyze the interactions between wealth inequality and financial globalization.
27
Appendix
A FIR and Symmetry Breaking: Matsuyama (2004)
In this section, we replicate the results of Matsuyama (2004) and highlight the role of
the extensive-margin channel by comparing the results in the settings with and without
the FIR. The setting with the FIR is essentially a limiting case of our model with the
constant MIR σ = 1 and θ → 0.
A.1 Model Settings with and without the FIR
The two model settings are identical to that in sector 2 except for two aspects:
• all agents have the same labor endowment which is normalized at one, and
• the investment project is not subject to the MIR.
In the first setting, agents differ in the technology endowment. A fraction of agents
born in period t and in country i have the linear project to convert mit units final goods
in period t to kit+1 = Rm
i
t units of capital goods in period t + 1, and they are called en-
trepreneurs; with no project, other agents only lend out their labor incomes and are called
households. The mass of entrepreneurs τ ∈ (0, 1) is exogenous, while the entrepreneurial
project size mit is endogenous. Aggregate investment takes place on the intensive margin,
Kit+1 = τRm
i
t. With no investment size requirement, it is called setting N.
In the second setting, all agents born in period t and country i are equally endowed
with the indivisible project to convert m units of final goods in period t into Rm units
of capital goods in period t + 1.28 If wit < m, an agent must borrow m − wit to start its
project, but the aggregate saving is not sufficient to allow all agents to run their projects.
According to Matsuyama (2004), random credit rationing allows a fraction τ it ∈ (0, 1) of
agents to get the loan m−wit to run the projects and they are called entrepreneurs, while
others can only lend out their labor incomes and are called households. Different from
setting N, the entrepreneurial project size m is exogenous, while the mass of entrepreneurs
τ it is endogenous.
29 Thus, aggregate investment takes place only on the extensive margin,
Kit+1 = τ
i
tRm. With f ixed investment size requirement, it is called setting F.
Figure 12 shows the individual production function in the two settings. In setting N,
the individual project is linear, kit+1 = Rm
i
t. In setting F, the project output is constant
at Rm for the input mit ≥ m and is zero for mit ∈ [0,m). For simplicity, we use τ it and
mit to denote the mass of entrepreneurs and the individual investment size in the model
28Matsuyama (2004) implicitly normalizes the individual project size at m = 1, while we allow m to
be a free parameter and analyze its impacts on symmetry breaking.
29Although the FIR results in the non-convexity of the individual production set, Matsuyama (2007,
2008) argues that assuming a continuum of homogeneous agents convexifies the production set.
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Figure 12: Individual Projects in the Two Settings
description. Setting N is characterized by the fixed mass of entrepreneurs, τ it = τ , while
setting F is characterized by the fixed project size, mit = m.
Entrepreneurs are subject to the borrowing constraints (3). Since households are
homogeneous and so are entrepreneurs, we drop the subscript j.
Under autarky, the markets for capital goods and credit clear each period.
Kit+1 = τ
i
tRm
i
t, (A.1)
τ it (m
i
t − wit) = (1− τ it )wit. (A.2)
Definition 3. Under autarky, a market equilibrium in country i is a set of agents’ choices,
{mit, ci,et , ci,ht , ψit}, the mass of entrepreneurs {τ it}, the prices {qit, wit, rit,Ωit}, and aggregate
quantities {Y it , Kit}, satisfying equations (1)-(2), (6)-(8), (10)-(11), (A.1)-(A.2).
τ it = τ is exogenous in setting N, while m
i
t = m is exogenous in setting F.
Under financial globalization, the equilibrium conditions are identical as under au-
tarky except for the domestic and world credit market conditions.
τ it (m
i
t − wit) = (1− τ it )wit − φitwit, (A.3)∫ 1
0
witφ
i
tdi = 0. (A.4)
Definition 4. Under financial globalization, a market equilibrium in country i is a set of
agents’ choices, {mit, ci,et , ci,ht , ψit}, the mass of entrepreneurs {τ it}, the prices {qit, wit,Ωit},
and aggregate quantities {Y it , Kit}, satisfying equations (1)-(2), (6)-(8), (10)-(11), (A.1),
and (A.3), and the interest rate is equalized across countries rit = r
∗
t and the world interest
rate r∗t is determined by equation (A.4).
τ it = τ is exogenous in setting N, while m
i
t = m is exogenous in setting F.
A.2 Equilibrium under Autarky
For simplicity, we suppress the country index i for the scenario of autarky.
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In setting N, according to equations (A.1) and (A.2), the equity-investment ratio is
constant at ψt =
wt
mt
= τ and domestic investment is fully financed by domestic saving
Kt+1 = Rτmt = Rwt. The law of motion for wage is characterized by equation (16).
In setting F, for wt < m, aggregate saving is too low to allow all agents to run their
projects. According to equations (A.1) and (A.2), the mass of entrepreneurs and the
equity-investment ratio are endogenous, τt = ψt =
wt
m
< 1, and domestic investment is
fully financed by domestic saving Kt+1 = Rτtm = Rwt. Then, the law of motion for
wage is the same as in setting N. For wt ≥ m, all agents self-finance their projects,
τt = ψt = 1. Given the fixed project size, the aggregate output of capital goods is
constant at Kt+1 = Rm and the law of motion for wage is flat at wt+1 =
(
Rm
ρ
)α
.
Proposition 5. In setting N, ψt = τ ; in setting F, ψt = τt =
wt
m
.
In both settings, there exists a unique, stable steady state in each country under autarky;
iff ψt ∈ (0, 1− λ], the borrowing constraints are binding;
iff ψt ∈ (1− λ, 1], the borrowing constraints are slack.
Proposition 5 is essentially the same as proposition 1 and lemma 1.
Interest Rate Response to Income Changes
If the borrowing constraints are slack, rt = Rqt+1 and, according to equation (20), the
interest rate declines in aggregate income.
Let us focus on the case of the binding borrowing constraints.
In setting N, combine equations (6), (16), (A.1)-(A.2) to get
rt =
λ
1− ψt qt+1R =
λ
1− τ w
−(1−α)
t R
αρ1−α. (A.5)
With the extensive margin mute, the interest rate declines in aggregate income, due to
the neoclassical effect, as in our model with σ = 0.
In setting F, combine equations (6), (16), (A.1)-(A.2) to get
rt =
λ
1− ψt qt+1R =
λ
1− τtw
−(1−α)
t R
αρ1−α. (A.6)
Higher aggregate income raises the agents’ labor income and the decline in the required
loan size m−wt allows more agents to get the loans and invest as entrepreneurs τt = wtm .
The decline in the mass of households (1 − τt) reduces the aggregate credit supply on
the extensive margin. If the extensive-margin effect dominates the neoclassical effect, the
interest rate rises in aggregate income, as in our model with σ = 1.
Lemma 3. Under autarky, the interest rate declines in aggregate income in setting N; for
λ ∈ (0, λ˜A), the interest rate rises in aggregate income in setting F, iff wt ∈ (ψ˜Am, ψ¯m)
or equivalently ψt =
wt
m
∈ (ψ˜A, ψ¯), where ψ˜A ≡ 1−α2−α and λ˜A ≡ 1− ψ˜A.
Figure 13 shows lemma 3 in the {λ, ψt} space for setting F, which is essentially the
limiting case of figure 3 with θ → 0. The analysis follows that in section 3.
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Figure 13: Interest Rate Patterns in the {λ, ψt} Space under Autarky
A.3 Equilibrium under Financial Globalization
From period t = 0 on, agents in country i are allowed to borrow or lend abroad. As a
small open economy, country i takes the world interest rate as given rit = r
∗. Without
loss of generality, we assume that r∗ = rA, where rA = λ1−ψAρ (rA = ρ) if the borrowing
constraints are binding (slack) in the autarkic steady state.
Proposition 6. Under financial integration, the autarkic steady state is still the unique,
stable steady state in setting N, while multiple steady states may arise in setting F if
λ ∈ (0, λˆF ), where λˆF ≡ α.
Proposition 6 is essentially the limiting case of proposition 3 with θ → 0.
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Figure 14: Laws of Motion for Wage: Setting N
In setting N, the autarkic interest rate declines in aggregate income. As in our
model with σ = 0, financial integration generates the investment-dampening effect, which
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makes the law of motion for wage around the autarkic steady state flatter than under
autarky. The solid (dashed) curves in figure 14 show the laws of motion for wage under
financial integration (autarky). The left (right) panel shows the case where the borrowing
constraints are binding (slack) in the steady state.
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Figure 15: Parameter Configuration for Symmetry Breaking: Setting F
In setting F, the autarkic interest rate may rise in aggregate income. As in our model
with σ = 1, financial integration may generate the investment-amplification effect, which
competes with the decreasing MPK. Let Z ≡ R
ρ
m−
1
ρ denote an auxiliary parameter.
Under autarky, ψA =
wA
m
=
(
R
ρ
)ρ
1
m
= Zρ is a function of the parameters {R, ρ,m}.
Figure 15 shows the parameter configuration for multiple steady states under financial
integration in the (λ, ψA) space and in the {λ, Z} space, respectively. The dashed line in
the left panel shows the threshold value ψ˜A defined in lemma 3. According to the proof
of propositions 3 and 6, figure 15 is the limiting case of figure 7 with θ → 0.
The right panel of figure 15 is almost identical as figure 5 of Matsuyama (2004) except
for the boundary between region AB and A. Implicitly, the mass of entrepreneurs cannot
exceed the total mass of population in each generation, τ it ≤ 1. Taking that into account,
the boundary between region AB and A is characterized by a piecewise function with two
subfunctions.30 This result is confirmed in our model with σ = 1 in section 4. Thus, we
correct an error in figure 5 of Matsuyama (2004).
The laws of motion for wage under financial integration versus under autarky in setting
F are qualitatively identical as those in our model with σ = 1 in section 4. See figure 16.
To sum up, the model with the FIR in Matsuyama (2004) is essentially the limiting
case of our model with σ = 1 and θ → 0.
30See the proof of proposition 6 for the analytical characterization of the two subfunctions.
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Figure 16: Laws of Motion for Wage: Setting F
A.4 Heterogeneity in Financial Development: Setting N
In section 5, we introduce the cross-country heterogeneity in financial development and
address three issues for a small open economy in the case of σ = 1. In order to highlight
the extensive-margin effect in the presence of the MIR and financial frictions, we conduct
the parallel analysis in a two-country version of setting N.
By assumption, λW < 1− τ so that the borrowing constraints are binding in country
W at the autarkic steady state with rW = λ
W ρ
1−τ .
A.4.1 Threshold Conditions for Financial Integration
The dashed curve in figure 17 shows the law of motion for wage in country S under
autarky. As in the case of σ = 0 in subsection 4.1, the negative interest rate response to
income changes under autarky ensures that, given r∗ = rW , there exists a unique steady
state under financial integration where the wage rate is
wS =

[
(1−τ)λS
λW
+ τ
]ρ
wA, if λ
S ≤ λˆS;(
1−τ
λW
)ρ
wA, if λ
S > λˆS,
where λˆS ≡ 1− τ
1− τ λ
W > λW . (A.7)
The thick (thin) curve in the left panel of figure 17 shows the law of motion for wage if
the level of financial development in country S is significantly (slightly) larger than that
in country W, while the right panel shows the case where λS < λW .
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Figure 17: Impacts of Financial Integration: Setting N
In setting N, there is a unique steady state under financial integration and, for λS <
λˆS, the steady-state income effect in country i is roughly log-linear in λ
S
λW
, regardless of
the initial income; in our model with the constant MIR (σ = 1), financial integration
may lead to multiple steady states and the steady-state income effect in country i may
depend on the initial income.
A.4.2 Domestic Financial Crises and Capital Controls
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Figure 18: Impacts of Domestic Financial Crisis: Setting N
With the same parameter values as for the left panel of figure 10, the dashed curve
in the left panel of figure 18 shows the law of motion for wage under autarky, while the
thin (thick) curve shows that in the scenario of λS1 (λ
S
2 ) under financial integration.
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Compared to the case of the constant MIR, the decline in λS has the different implica-
tions. First, the steady-state income effect is much smaller, according to equation (A.7);
second, when λS goes back to its initial level, country S returns to its initial steady state,
regardless of its initial income. In the absence of the MIR, there is no path dependence
and capital controls are not necessary.
A.4.3 World Interest Rate Shocks and Economic Volatility
According to equation (A.7), a decline in λW reduces the world interest rate, which affects
the steady-state aggregate income in country S roughly in a log-linear way. The steady-
state income effects may depend on the level of financial development in country S, which
is not as dramatic as in our model with σ = 1.
B Alternative Specifications
We have made many assumptions to highlight the core mechanism behind symmetry
breaking. One can extend our model setting in various aspects and our results should
still hold as long as the positive interest rate response to income changes is maintained
or reinforced. In this section, we briefly discuss two alternative specifications.31
B.1 Endogenizing the Level of Financial Development
The empirical literature has documented extensive evidences on the positive impacts of
financial development on economic growth (Buera, Kaboski, and Shin, 2011; Christopou-
los and Tsionas, 2004; King and Levine, 1993; Levine, Loayza, and Beck, 2000; Rioja
and Valev, 2004). Conversely, economic development also induces the financial sectors
to evolve and progress endogenously so as to serve the demand from the real sectors in
the form of ameliorating the information asymmetry among market participants as well
as improving risk-sharing opportunities (Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 1997; Laeven, Levine,
and Michalopoulos, 2015; Song and Thakor, 2010).
For simplicity, we keep the level of financial development exogenous at λ in the anal-
ysis. One can relax the assumption and allow the level of financial development to be
higher in the rich than in the poor country, ∂λt
∂Yt
> 0. Given the binding borrowing
constraint, combine equations (21)-(22) to get the autarkic interest rate,
ln rt = ln qt+1R + lnλt − ln(1− τ 1−θt ),
∂ ln rt
∂ lnwt
=
∂ ln qt+1R
∂ lnwt︸ ︷︷ ︸
the neoclassical effect (-)
+
∂ lnλt
∂ lnwt︸ ︷︷ ︸
the financial-development effect (+)
−∂ ln(1− τ
1−θ
t )
∂ ln τt
∂ ln τt
∂ lnwt︸ ︷︷ ︸
the extensive-margin effect
.
31This section is motivated by the insightful comments of one of our referees.
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• In the case of σ = 1, the extensive-margin effect is positive ∂ ln τt
∂ lnwt
= σ > 0. The
positive financial-development effect reinforces the extensive-margin effect, which
enhances the positive interest rate response to income changes.
• In the case of σ = 0, the extensive-margin effect is absent ∂ ln τt
∂ lnwt
= 0. Nevertheless,
if the positive financial-development effect can dominate the negative neoclassical
effect, the interest rate responds positively to income changes.
In the setting of endogenous financial development, aggregate income affects the interest
rate on the aggregate credit demand side; in the setting of the constant MIR, aggregate
income affects the interest rate on the aggregate credit supply side. This way, the two
settings feature two competing theories on symmetry breaking.
Endogenizing financial development may affect symmetry breaking in two ways.
• If the borrowing constraints are binding, the financial-development effect enhances
the positive interest rate response to income change under autarky, which may raise
the possibility and the magnitude of symmetry breaking.
• The borrowing constraints are binding iff ψt < 1−λt, where ∂ψt∂Yt > 0. The financial-
development effect makes the borrowing constraints more likely to be slack. In that
case, the interest rate declines in aggregate income under autarky, which reduces
the possibility and the magnitude of symmetry breaking.
Thus, endogenizing financial development may have ambiguous impacts on the possibility
and the magnitude of symmetry breaking.
B.2 Endogenizing the Project Choices
In our model, agents have one indivisible project and those who cannot meet the MIR can
only lend out their labor income. Alternatively, one can assume that agents have the two
projects, indexed by M and N. Project M has the positive MIR m and its productivity is
R, as in our model with σ = 1; project N has no MIR and its productivity is γR, where
γ ∈ (0, 1) denotes the relative productivity.32 Figure 19 shows the production functions
of two projects, where mp,t and kp,t+1 denote the input and output of project p ∈ {M,N}.
In the two-project setting, we still call those who can meet the MIR of project M
as entrepreneurs and the rest as households. Let ψ¯ ≡ 1 − λ and w¯A ≡ Fψ¯ 11−θ . Under
autarky, for wt > w¯A, the borrowing constraints are slack and rt = Rqt+1 > γRqt+1 so
that households do not invest in project N; for wt < w¯A, the borrowing constraints are
binding, rt =
λ
1−ψtRqt+1, and whether households invest in project N depends on the
relative productivity γ and aggregate income.
32Our model can be considered as a special case in this setting with γ = 0. In a more general setting,
one can assume that agents have the access to N+1 projects. Let mn and Rn denote the MIR and
the productivity of project n = 0, 1, 2, .., N . Projects are ranked according to the MIR (m0 = 0 and
mn > mn−1 for n = 1, 2, ..., N) and the productivity (R0 ≥ 0 and Rn > Rn−1 for n = 1, 2, ..., N).
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Figure 19: The Production Functions of Two Projects
Let us focus on the interval of wt ∈ (0, w¯A). Figure 20 shows the mass of entrepreneurs
τt, the equity-investment ratio ψt, and the relative interest rate Υt ≡ rtqt+1R as the functions
of wt ∈ (0, w¯t). The solid (dashed) curves show their patterns in the case of γ < λ (γ > λ).
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Figure 20: Patterns of Endogenous Variables: wt ∈ (0, w¯A)
For γ < λ, λ
1−ψt > λ > γ and rt =
λ
1−ψtRqt+1 > γRqt+1 so that nobody invests in
project N and the allocation is the same as in our model with σ = 1. Thus, the solid
curves in figure 20 also show the patterns of those variables in our model with σ = 1.
For γ > λ, let ψ ≡ 1− λ
γ
and wA ≡ Fψ
1
1−θ .
• If wt ∈ [wA, w¯A), ψt > ψ and rt = λ1−ψt qt+1R > qt+1γR so that nobody invests in
project N and the allocation is the same as in our model with σ = 1.
• If wt ∈ (0, wA), ψt = ψ and rt = λ1−ψtRqt+1 = γRqt+1 so that households are
indifferent between investing in project N and lending. The total investments in
project N and in project M are
∫∞
t
(1−θ)jwt
ψ
dG(j) =

− 1−θ
θ
t
ψ
wt and (1 − 
− 1−θ
θ
t
ψ
)wt
respectively. The aggregate output of capital goods in period t+1 is Kt+1 = ΓtRwt,
where Γt ≡ γ + (1− γ) 
− 1−θ
θ
t
ψ
measures the allocation efficiency.33
33In our model, only project M is available so that aggregate saving is fully used to produce capital
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In our one-project model, aggregate saving is entirely used to finance the productive
project under autarky, thanks to the ”unconstrained” adjustment of the interest
rate. In the two-project model, project N serves as an outside option for lenders
and its marginal rate of return essentially becomes a ”floor” for the interest rate.
For γ > λ and wt ∈ (0, wA), a fraction of aggregate saving is allocated inefficiently in
the less productive project, due to the ”interest rate floor”. In this case, the higher
the aggregate income, the larger the mass of agents who overcome the MIR and
invest in the more productive projects, the more efficient the aggregate investment,
the lower the price of capital goods and the rate of return to the less productive
project, the larger the households’ lending. The aggregate credit supply declines
on the extensive margin and rises on the intensive margin. As long as project N is
still invested, the intensive-margin effect dominates so that the interest rate falls in
aggregate income.
Lemma 4. If γ < λ[1 + (1− θ)(1− α)], lemma 2 still holds and so does proposition 3.
• According to Lemma 4, if the productivity difference of the two project is small,
i.e., γ > λ[1 + (1 − θ)(1 − α)], allowing the endogenous project choices affects
the interest rate response to income changes, which may reduce the possibility of
symmetry breaking.
• If the productivity difference of the two project is large γ < λ[1 + (1− θ)(1− α)],
the condition specified in lemma 2 still holds so that the symmetry breaking results
are unaffected. Thus, when symmetry breaking happens, the endogenous project
choice and resource allocation may amplify the size of income polarization.
goods at the rate of R and financial frictions only distort the interest rates, rt < qt+1R < Ωt. In the
two-project model, if γ > λ and wt ∈ (0, wA), a fraction of domestic saving is allocated in project N and
the mass of agents investing in project M is lower than in the one-project model. In this case, aggregate
allocation is inefficient Γt < 1; according to equation (9), t =
ψF
wt
and ∂Γt∂wt > 0. The higher the aggregate
income, the larger the mass of agents who meet the MIR, the larger the fraction of aggregate saving
allocated in project M, the more efficient the aggregate allocation. Besides the interest rate, financial
frictions also distort aggregate efficiency through resource allocation in the two-project model.
Matsuyama (2007) develops a multi-project model where projects differ in terms of productivity and
pledgeability. With a sufficiently low net wealth, the credit goes to the project with the highest pledgeable
value rather than to the most productive project; with a sufficiently high net wealth, the borrowing
constraints are slack so that the credit goes to the most productive project. Matsuyama (2007) shows
that an endogenous shift in the composition of the credit across projects with different productivity levels
may lead to multiple steady states, which helps explain a variety of economic phenomena, e.g., credit
traps, endogenous credit cycles, credit collapse, growth miracles, leapfrogging, and etc.
In our two-project model, if γ > λ and wt ∈ (0, wt), both projects are invested in equilibrium and the
endogenous allocation of aggregate saving among the two projects affects the aggregate efficiency. Thus,
our model shares the same feature as Matsuyama (2007) in the sense that, in the presence of financial
frictions, aggregate efficiency is endogenously determined by the resource allocation among projects with
different productivity. This asset allocation effect competes with the decreasing MPK, which may lead
to multiple steady states under autarky. The detailed analysis is beyond the scope of this paper.
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C Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. According to equation (16), the law of motion for wage is log-linear, lnwt+1 =
α lnwt + α ln
R
ρ
, with a slope less than unity, α < 1. Thus, there exists a unique and
stable steady state with wA =
(
R
ρ
)ρ
.
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. The proof consists of two steps.
Step 1: the interest rate under the binding borrowing constraints
Combine equations (1)-(2) to get the factor price equation,
qαt w
1−α
t = 1. (C.1)
Rewrite the binding borrowing constraints (6) into rt =
λ
1−ψt qt+1R and combine it with
equations (16) and (C.1) to get equation (17).
According to the credit market clearing equation,
Dt = wt(
1
ψt
− 1)−(
1
θ
−1)
t , St = wt[1− −(
1
θ
−1)
t ], Dt = St, ⇒ ψt = −(
1
θ
−1)
t . (C.2)
Combine equations (9) and (C.2) to get equation (18).
Thus, one can use equations (17)-(18) to solve ψt and rt as the functions of wt.
Step 2: the condition for the binding borrowing constraints
According to equation (17), the borrowing constraints are binding iff rt < qt+1R or
equivalently ψt ∈ (0, ψ¯), where ψ¯ ≡ 1− λ.
Combine wt = (1− α)Yt with equation (18) to get ψt as a function of Yt,
σ lnYt =
1
1− θ lnψt + lnm− ln(1− θ)(1− α), (C.3)
∂ lnψt
∂ lnm
=− (1− θ) < 0, ∂ lnψt
∂ lnYt
= σ(1− θ), ⇒ sgn
(
∂ψt
∂Yt
)
= sgn(σ). (C.4)
In the boundary case where the borrowing constraints are weakly binding, ψt = ψ¯,
equation (C.3) can be rewritten as m = (Yt)
σΛ.
Taking into account equations (C.4), for σ = 0 and σ = 1, the condition for the
binding borrowing constraints ψt < ψ¯ can be restated as m > (Yt)
σΛ and the condition
for the slack borrowing constraints ψt > ψ¯ can be restated as m < (Yt)
σΛ.
Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. If the borrowing constraints are slack, ∂ ln rt
∂ lnwt
= −(1− α) < 0. See equation (20).
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If the borrowing constraints are binding, ψt ∈ (0, ψ¯) and rewrite equation (17) as
ln rt = (α− 1) lnwt − ln(1− ψt) + lnλRαρ1−α, (C.5)
⇒ ∂ ln rt
∂ lnwt
= α− 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
the neoclassical effect
+
σ(1− θ)
1
ψt
− 1 .︸ ︷︷ ︸
the extensive-margin effect
(C.6)
For σ = 0, according to equation (C.6), the extensive-margin effect is absent and, due
to the neoclassical effect, ∂ ln rt
∂ lnwt
= α− 1 < 0.
For σ = 1, according to equation (C.6), the extensive-margin effect works against the
neoclassical effect. For ψt ∈ (0, ψ˜A), the neoclassical effect dominates so that ∂ ln rt∂ lnwt < 0;
for ψt ∈ (ψ˜A, ψ¯), the extensive-margin effect dominates so that ∂ ln rt∂ lnwt > 0.
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. The proof consists of three steps. For simplicity, we suppress the country index i.
Step 1: the law of motion for wage under financial integration
As a small open economy, country i takes the world interest rate as exogenously given
at r∗. Iff Rqt+1 > r∗, the borrowing constraints are binding, which gives equation (28). In
this case, the law of motion for wage depends on the mass-of-entrepreneurs constraints.
• If the mass-of-entrepreneurs constraint is slack, τt < 1, not all agents can meet
the MIR t = τ
−θ
t > 1, and equation (9) becomes 
i
t =
ψitF
(wit)
σ . Combine aggregate
investment Kt+1
R
=
∫∞
t
ljwt
ψt
dG(lj) =
wt
−( 1
θ
−1)
t
ψt
with equations (1)-(2) and (9) to get
equation (29). Use equations (28) and (29) to get
∂wt+1
∂wt
=
wt+1
wt
α[σ(1− θ) + θ]
K
> 0, where K ≡ (1− α)1− ψt
ψt
+ θ > θ. (C.7)
• If the mass-of-entrepreneurs constraint is binding, τt = 1, all agents can meet the
MIR t = τ
−θ
t = 1, and equation (9) becomes 
i
t = 1. Combine aggregate investment
Kt+1
R
= wt
ψt
with equations (1)-(2) to get (30). Use equations (28) and (30) to get
∂wt+1
∂wt
=
wt+1
wt
1
1 + 1
ψtρ
> 0. (C.8)
According to equations (C.7)-(C.8), the law of motion for wage is monotonically increasing
when the borrowing constraints are binding.
The borrowing constraints are slack, iff Rqt+1 = r
∗. Combine it with equation (C.1)
to get wt+1 = wA
(
ρ
r∗
)ρ
. In this case, the law of motion for wage is flat at wt+1 = w¯t+1 ≡
wA
(
ρ
r∗
)ρ
, which is also the upper bound of wt+1.
Step 2: the threshold condition for two constraints
Here, we derive the condition under which the mass-of-entrepreneurs constraint and
the borrowing constraints are binding and then describe the law of motion for wage.
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Combine τt = 
− 1
θ
t with equations (9) and (28)-(30) to get
for τt = 1,
∂ lnψt
∂ lnwt
=
1
1 + ψt
1−ψt
1
1−α
∈ (0, 1); (C.9)
for τt < 1,
∂ lnψt
∂ lnwt
= [σ(1− θ) + θ]
(
1− θ
K
)
> 0, and (C.10)
∂ ln τt
∂ lnwt
=
1
θ
[
σ − ∂ lnψt
∂ lnwt
]
=
−
(K−θ)
K
< 0, if σ = 0;
1
K
> 0, if σ = 1.
(C.11)
Thus, ψt increases in wt. For wt → 0, ψt → 0 and wt+1 → λρw¯t+1, according to equation
(28). Thus, the law of motion for wage has a positive vertical intercept at wt+1 ≡ λρw¯t+1,
which is also the lower bound of wt+1.
In the following, we first use ψt to characterize the threshold condition of τt = 1 (or
equivalently t = 1) and then compute the corresponding value of wt.
In the case of σ = 0, put t = 1 into equation (9) to get a threshold value ψ0 ≡ 1F .
• If ψ0 > ψ¯ or equivalently 1F > 1− λ, the law of motion for wage is defined over two
intervals. Let w¯F = (1− λ)wA
(
ρ
r∗
) 1
1−α .
– For wt ∈ (0, w¯F ), τt = 1 and the borrowing constraints are binding, ψt ∈ (0, ψ¯).
The law of motion for wage is defined by equations (28)-(29).
– For wt > w¯F , the borrowing constraints are slack, Rqt+1 = r
∗, and the law of
motion for wage is flat at wt+1 = w¯t+1 = wA
(
ρ
r∗
)ρ
.
• If ψ0 < ψ¯ or equivalently 1F < 1 − λ, the law of motion for wage is defined over
three intervals. Let wˆF ≡ 1F
[
λ
1− 1
F
] 1
1−α
wA
(
ρ
r∗
) 1
1−α and w¯F ≡ [(1−λ)F]
1
θ
F
wA
(
ρ
r∗
) 1
1−α .
– For wt ∈ (0, wˆF ), τt = 1 and the borrowing constraints are binding, ψt ∈
(0, ψ0). The law of motion for wage is defined by equations (28)-(29).
– For wt ∈ (wˆF , w¯F ), τt < 1 and the borrowing constraints are binding, ψt ∈
(ψ0, ψ¯). The law of motion for wage is defined by equations (28) and (30).
– For wt > w¯F , the borrowing constraints are slack, Rqt+1 = r
∗, and the law of
motion for wage is flat at wt+1 = w¯t+1 = wA
(
ρ
r∗
)ρ
.
In the case of σ = 1, put t = 1 into equation (9) and combine it with equations (28)
and (29) to get a threshold value ψ1 = 1− λρr∗
[
wA
F
]1−α
.
• if ψ1 > ψ¯ or equivalently ρ
[
wA
F
]1−α
< r∗, the law of motion for wage is defined over
two intervals. Let w¯F ≡ 1−λψA wA
(
ρ
r∗
) θ
1−α .
– For wt ∈ (0, w¯F ), τt < 1 and the borrowing constraints are binding, ψt ∈ (0, ψ¯).
The law of motion for wage is defined by equations (28) and (29).
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– For wt > w¯F , the borrowing constraints are slack, Rqt+1 = r
∗, and the law of
motion for wage is flat at wt+1 = w¯t+1 = wA
(
ρ
r∗
)ρ
.
• if ψ1 < ψ¯ or equivalently ρ
[
wA
F
]1−α
> r∗, the law of motion for wage is defined over
three intervals. Let wˆF ≡ Fψ1 and w¯F ≡ (1− λ)wA
(
ρ
r∗
) 1
1−α .
– For wt ∈ (0, wˆF ), τt < 1 and the borrowing constraints are binding, ψt ∈
(0, ψ1). The law of motion for wage is defined by equations (28) and (29).
– For wt ∈ (wˆF , w¯F ), τt = 1 and the borrowing constraints are binding, ψt ∈
(ψ1, ψ¯). The law of motion for wage is defined by equations (28) and (30).
– For wt > w¯F , the borrowing constraints are slack, Rqt+1 = r
∗, and the law of
motion for wage is flat at wt+1 = w¯t+1 = wA
(
ρ
r∗
)ρ
.
Step 3: the conditions for multiple steady states under financial integration
As proved above, for wt ∈ (0,∞), wt+1 is bounded between wt+1 > 0 and w¯t+1 <∞;
according to equations (C.8) and (C.7), the law of motion for wage is upward-sloping
(flat) under financial integration, if the borrowing constraints are binding (slack). Thus,
the law of motion for wage must cross the 45◦ line from the left at least once and hence,
there exists at least a stable steady state under financial integration.
Multiple steady states may arise under financial integration, iff the slope of the law
of motion for wage is equal to or larger than unity at one steady state.
For σ = 0, use equations (C.8) and (C.7) to evaluate ∂wt+1
∂wt
at any steady state(s),
∂wt+1
∂wt
‖wt+1=wt =

1
1+ 1
ψtρ
∈ (0, 1) and τ = 1, if wt ∈ (0,min{wˆF , w¯F}];
1
1+ 1
ψtρ
+( 1
θ
−1) 1−ψt
ρψt
∈ (0, 1) and τ < 1, if wt ∈ (min{wˆF , w¯F}, w¯F ];
0, if wt > w¯F .
(C.12)
Since the slope of the law of motion for wage at any steady state is non-negative and less
than unity, the steady state under financial integration must be unique and stable. See
figure 5.
For σ = 1, use equations (C.8) and (C.7) to evaluate ∂wt+1
∂wt
at the steady state(s),
∂wt+1
∂wt
‖wt+1=wt =

1 +
(
ψt − 1−α1−θ
) (1−θ)
Kψt
and τ < 1, if wt ∈ (0,min{wˆF , w¯F}];
1
1+ 1
ψtρ
∈ (0, 1) and τ = 1, if wt ∈ (min{wˆF , w¯F}, w¯F ];
0, if wt > w¯F .
(C.13)
• The slope of the law of motion for wage is non-negative and less than unity at the
steady state in the interval of wt > (min{wˆF , w¯F}, w¯F ).
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• The slope of the law of motion for wage is positive and can exceed unity at the
steady state in the interval of wt ∈ (0,min{wˆF , w¯F}], if ψt > 1−α1−θ . Here, {α, θ} are
critical for the existence of multiple steady states under financial integration.
– If θ > α, 1−α
1−θ > 1 > ψ¯ > ψt so that
∂wt+1
∂wt
‖wt+1=wt ∈ [0, 1) for wt ∈ (0,∞).
Thus, the steady state is unique and stable under financial integration.
– If θ < α, multiple steady state may arise under financial integration, depending
on the model parameters.
In the following, we focus on the case of θ < α. Use equations (28)-(30) to get
∂wt+1
∂w2t
=

[
1−2θ
1−θ − ψt 1−α−θ1−α
]
J(1−α)2(1−θ)2
wtψtK3
, if τt < 1;
− ψt
(1−α)(1+ψtρ)2
J
wt
< 0, if τt = 1.
(C.14)
For wt < w¯F , the law of motion for wage is concave in the case of τt = 1, while its shape
depends on the parameters {θ, α, λ} in the case of τt < 1.
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Figure 21: The Shape of the Law of Motion for Wage: σ = 1 and τt > 1
Figure 21 shows the shape of the law of motion for wage in four scenarios in the {α, θ}
space. Let ψˇF ≡ 1 + θ(α−θ)(1−α−θ)(1−θ) .
• For {θ, α} in region USS, θ > α and, as proved above, there exists a unique, stable
steady state, regardless of the shape of the law of motion for wage.
• For {θ, α} in region X1, α > θ and 1 − α − θ > 0 so that ψˇF > 1 > ψ¯ > ψt and
1−2θ
1−θ − ψt 1−α−θ1−α =
(
ψˇF − ψt
)
1−α−θ
1−α > 0. Thus, H > 0 and the law of motion for
wage is convex for ψt ∈ (0, ψ¯).
• For {θ, α} in region X2, 1− 2θ > 0 and 1− θ − α < 0 so that 1−2θ
1−θ > 0 > ψt
1−α−θ
1−α .
Thus, H > 0 and the law of motion for wage is convex for ψt ∈ (0, ψ¯).
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• For {θ, α} in region M, α > θ and 1− θ− α < 0 so that ψˇF = 1− θ(α−θ)(α+θ−1)(1−θ) < 1.
– If θ(α−θ)
(α+θ−1)(1−θ) < λ or equivalently ψˇF > ψ¯ > ψt,
1−2θ
1−θ − ψt 1−α−θ1−α = (ψˇF −
ψt)
1−α−θ
1−α < 0. Thus, H < 0 and the law of motion for wage is concave for
ψt ∈ (0, ψ¯).
– If θ(θ−α)
(1−α−θ)(1−θ) > λ or equivalently ψˇF < ψ¯. Then, for ψt ∈ (0, ψˇF ), H < 0 and
the law of motion for wage is concave; for ψt ∈ (ψˇF , ψ¯), H > 0 and the law of
motion for wage is convex.
In the following, we analyze three cases where the multiple steady states arise in the
case of σ = 1 and r∗ = rA, as shown in the upper-panels of figure 8. We also derive the
boundary conditions for the five regions of figure 7.
Case 1: consider the upper-right triangle of figure 7 where the borrowing constraints
are slack at the autarkic steady state with rA = ρ and ψA ∈ (ψ¯, 1]. Given r∗ = rA = ρ,
∂wt+1
∂wt
‖wA = 0 so that the autarkic steady state is still stable under financial integration.
Compare the upper-right and the lower-right panels of figure 8. Multiple steady states
arise if the law of motion for wage crosses the 45◦ line at point M with ∂wt+1
∂wt
‖wM ≥ 1 and
wM < w¯F or equivalently ψM < ψ¯. Use equation (C.13) to get ψM >
1−α
1−θ . Combine it
with (9) and (28)-(29). Then, region BC in figure 7 is defined by,
λ <
α− θ
1− θ and ψ¯ < ψA ≤ min{ψBC , 1}, where ψBC ≡
1− α
1− θ
[
α− θ
(1− θ)λ
]α−θ
1−α
. (C.15)
Case 2: consider the lower-left triangle of figure 7 where the borrowing constraints
are binding at the autarkic steady state with ψA ∈ (0, ψ¯) and rA = λρ1−ψA < ρ. As shown
in the upper-left panel of figure 8, given r∗ = rA under financial integration, case B arises
iff ∂wt+1
∂wt
‖wA ≥ 1 at the autarkic steady state. Use equation (C.13) to get
λ <
α− θ
1− θ and ψˆF < ψA ≤ ψ¯, where ψˆF ≡
1− α
1− θ . (C.16)
which defines region B in figure 7.
Case 3: consider the region with ψA < min{ψˆF , ψ¯} in figure 7. Since ∂wt+1∂wt ‖wA < 1,
the autarkic steady state is still stable under financial integration.
Given ψA < min{ψˆF , ψ¯}, if the law of motion for wage is tangent with the 45◦ line at
point M, ψM =
1−α
1−θ must hold, according to equation (C.13). Combine it with wt+1 = wt
and equations (28) and (29) to get ψA(1 − ψA)
α−θ
1−α = ψM(1 − ψM)
α−θ
1−α and the unique
solution for ψA is ψA = ψM =
1−α
1−θ , which contradicts the assumption ψA < min{ψˆF , ψ¯}.
Thus, the law of motion cannot be tangent with the 45◦ line in this case.
According to step 2, the law of motion for wage has one or two kinks, depending on
the relative size of ψ1 and ψ¯. Compare the upper-middle and the lower-left panel of figure
8. Financial integration may lead to multiple steady states in two subcases.
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• Case 3.1: as shown in step 2, given r∗ = rA = λρ1−ψA < ρ, for ψ1 > ψ¯ or equivalently
(1 − ψA)ψ
1−α
1−θ
A < λ, the law of motion for wage has a kink at wt = w¯t. Multiple
steady states arise if the kink is above the 45◦ line, w¯t+1 ≥ w¯F , which gives
ψA(1− ψA)
α−θ
1−α ≥ (1− λ)λα−θ1−α , ψA < min{ψˆF , ψ¯}, and (1− ψA)ψ
1−α
1−θ
A < λ. (C.17)
• Case 3.2: for ψ1 < ψ¯, or equivalently (1−ψA)ψ
1−α
1−θ
A > λ, the law of motion for wage
has two kinks at wt = wˆF and wt = w¯F . Multiple steady states arise if the kink at
wt = wˆF is above the 45
◦ line, which gives
(2− ψA)ψ
1−α
1−θ
A ≥ 1, ψA < min{ψˆF , ψ¯}, and (1− ψA)ψ
1−α
1−θ
A > λ. (C.18)
Region AB is defined by conditions (C.17) and (C.18).
Proof of Corollary 1
Proof. The proof follows closely that for lemma 1.
Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. According to figure 9, given ψA and r
∗ = λ
W ρ
1−ψA where λ
W < 1− ψA, we compute
λ¯S by making the law of motion for wage tangent with the 45◦ line at point M in the
convex part, ψM =
1−α
1−θ < 1− λ¯S. Following the proof of proposition 3, we get
λ¯S ≡ λW (1− ψM)ψ
1−α
α−θ
M
(1− ψA)ψ
1−α
α−θ
A
> λW . (C.19)
For λS > λ¯S, given ψA and λ
W < 1− ψA, the law of motion for wage crosses the 45◦ line
once and only once at the concave part or at the flat part where the steady-state wage
rate is higher than wA. See step 2 in the proof of proposition 3.
According to figure 9, given ψA and r
∗ = λ
W ρ
1−ψA where λ
W < 1 − ψA, we compute λS
by making the kink point of the law of motion for wage on the 45◦ line. According to
step 2 in the proof of proposition 3, let ψ1 = 1− λSρr∗ ψ
1−α
1−θ
A .
• If ψ1 > 1 − λS or equivalently λW > (1 − ψA)ψ
1−α
1−θ
A , the law of motion for wage is
defined over two intervals with the kink point at wt = w¯F ≡ 1−λψA wA
(
ρ
r∗
) θ
1−α and
wt+1 = w¯t+1 = wA
(
ρ
r∗
)ρ
. By setting w¯t+1 = w¯F , we get the threshold value
λS ≡ 1− ψA
(
1− ψA
λW
)α−θ
1−α
. (C.20)
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• If ψ1 < 1 − λS or equivalently λW < (1 − ψA)ψ
1−α
1−θ
A , the law of motion for wage is
defined over three intervals and the kink point between the convex and the concave
parts is defined as wt = wˆF ≡ Fψ1 and wt+1 = wˆt+1 ≡ wA
[
λS(1−ψA)
(1−ψ1)λW
]ρ
. By setting
wˆt+1 = wˆF , we get the threshold value
λS ≡ λ
W
1− ψA
(
ψ
− 1−α
1−θ
A − 1
)
. (C.21)
For λS < λS, given ψA and λ
W < 1− ψA, the law of motion for wage crosses the 45◦ line
once and only once at the convex part where the steady-state wage rate is lower than wA.
For the intermediate case where λS ∈ (λS, λ¯S), multiple steady states arise under
financial integration. The threshold value w˜S is defined as the wage rate at the unstable
steady state.
Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. Under autarky, the law of motion for wage in setting N is wt+1 =
(
R
ρ
wt
)α
, identical
as that in our model with σ = 0; in setting F, the law of motion for wage is
wt+1 =

(
R
ρ
wt
)α
, for wt ∈ (0,m);
(Rm
ρ
)α, for wt > m.
Thus, the proof follows exactly the proofs for proposition 1 and lemma 1.
Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. In setting N, if τ ∈ (1 − λ, 1), the borrowing constraints are slack, ψt = τ ∈
(1 − λ, 1) and, according to equation (A.5), ∂ ln rt
∂ lnwt
= α − 1 < 0; if τ ∈ (0, 1 − λ], the
borrowing constraints are binding, ψt = τ ∈ (0, 1− λ), and, according to equation (A.5),
∂ ln rit
∂ lnwit
= α− 1 < 0.
In setting F, if ψt ∈ (1 − λ, 1), the borrowing constraints are slack and, according
to equation (A.6), ∂ ln rt
∂ lnwt
= α − 1 < 0. If ψt ∈ (0, 1 − λ), the borrowing constraints are
binding ψt =
wt
m
∈ (0, 1− λ). Define ψ˜A ≡ 1−α2−α . Rewrite equation (A.6)
ln rit = (α− 1) lnwit − ln(1− ψt) + lnλRαρ1−α.
⇒ ∂ ln r
i
t
∂ lnwit
= (α− 1) + ψt
1− ψt
< 0, iff ψt ∈ (0, ψ˜A);> 0, iff ψt ∈ (ψ˜A, 1− λ).
Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. For notational simplicity, we suppress the country index i. By assumption, m >(
R
ρ
)ρ
and hence, wA =
(
R
ρ
)ρ
< m, implying that only a fraction of agents can become
entrepreneurs in the autarkic steady state τA =
wA
m
< 1.
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Steady-State Property under Financial Integration in Setting N
The borrowing constraints are binding, if Rqit+1 > r
∗ or equivalently ψit < ψ¯ ≡ 1 − λ.
Combine equations (1)-(3) with rit = r
∗ to get the law of motion for wage,
r∗(mt − wt) = λqt+1Rmt ⇒ r∗
[ ρ
R
w
1
α
t+1 − τwt
]
= λρwt+1, (C.22)
∂wt+1
∂wt
=
wt+1
wt
1
1 +
w
1
α
t+1
Rτwt
and
∂2wt+1
∂w2t
= −w
1
ρ
−1
t+1
ταR
(
∂wt+1
∂wt
)3
< 0. (C.23)
Equation (C.22) implies that, for wt → 0, the law of motion for wage has a positive
vertical intercept at wt+1 = λ
ρwA
(
ρ
r∗
)ρ
. Define w¯F =
1−λ
τ
wA
(
ρ
r∗
) 1
1−α .
• For wt ∈ (0, w¯F ), the borrowing constraints are binding and the law of motion for
wage is upward-sloping and concave, according to equations (C.23).
• For wt > w¯F , aggregate investment are so high that Rqt+1 = r∗ and the borrowing
constraints are slack. The law of motion for wage is flat at w¯t+1 = wA
(
ρ
r∗
)ρ
.
Use equation (C.23) to evaluate ∂wt+1
∂wt
at any steady state(s),
∂wt+1
∂wt
‖wt+1=wt =

1
1+
w
1
α
t+1
Rτwt
∈ (0, 1), if wt ∈ (0, w¯F ];
0, if wt > w¯F .
(C.24)
Since the slope of the law of motion for wage at any steady state is non-negative and less
than unity, the steady state under financial integration must be unique and stable. See
figure (14).
Steady-State Property under Financial Integration in Setting F
The proof is essentially the same as that for proposition 3. We first analyze the shape of
the law of motion for wage and then describe the conditions for multiple steady states.
In particular, we explicitly take into account the mass-of-entrepreneurs constraints.
The borrowing constraints are binding, if Rqt+1 > r
∗ or equivalently ψt < ψ¯ ≡ 1− λ.
Combine equations (1)-(3) with rt = r
∗ to get the law of motion for wage,
ψt =
wt
m
= 1− λqt+1R
r∗
= 1− λρ
r∗
(
wA
wt+1
) 1
ρ
, (C.25)
∂wt+1
∂wt
=
wt+1
wt
[
1 +
ψt − (1− α)
(1− α)(1− ψt)
]
=
wt+1
wt
ψtρ
1− ψt > 0, (C.26)
∂2wt+1
∂(wt)2
=
(
∂wt+1
∂wt
)2
1
αwt+1wt
> 0. (C.27)
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According to equation (C.26), for wt → 0, ψt → 0 and the law of motion for wage has
a positive vertical intercept at wt+1 = wt+1 ≡ λρwA
(
ρ
r∗
)ρ
, as in setting N. Combine
equation (C.25) with (1)-(2) and then compute the mass of entrepreneurs,
wt+1 = wA
[
λρ
r∗(1− ψt)
]ρ
⇒ τt = Kt+1
Rm
=
ρ(wt+1)
1
α
Rm
=
wA
m
[
λρ
r∗(1− ψt)
] 1
1−α
. (C.28)
The mass of entrepreneurs is constrained by the population size in each generation,
τt ≤ 1, ⇒ ψt ≤ ψ1 ≡ 1−
(wA
m
)1−α λρ
r∗
. (C.29)
In the following, I characterize the shape of the law of motion for wage, taking into
account the borrowing constraints and the mass-of-entrepreneurs constraint.
• If ψ1 > ψ¯ or equivalently ρ
(
wA
m
)1−α
< r∗, let w¯F ≡ (1− λ)m.
– For wt ∈ (0, w¯F ), τt < 1 and the borrowing constraints are binding, ψt ∈ (0, ψ¯).
The law of motion for wage is convex and defined by equation (C.25).
– For wt > w¯F , the borrowing constraints are slack, Rqt+1 = r
∗. The law of
motion for wage is flat at wt+1 = wA
(
ρ
r∗
)ρ
.
• If ψ1 < ψ¯ or equivalently ρ
(
wA
m
)1−α
> r∗, let w¯F ≡ mψ1.
– For wt ∈ (0, w¯F ), τt < 1 and the borrowing constraints are binding, ψt ∈ (0, ψ¯).
The law of motion for wage is convex and defined by equation (C.25).
– For wt > w¯F , the borrowing constraints are binding, ψt < ψ¯. The law of
motion for wage is flat at wt+1 =
(
Rm
ρ
)α
.
According to equation (C.26), if ψt > 1 − α holds at any steady state in the interval of
wt ∈ (0,min{ψ1, ψ¯}), the slope of the law of motion for wage at the steady state exceeds
unity so that multiple steady states arise. Figure 16 shows the laws of motion for wage
under financial integration versus under autarky in five cases, while figure 15 shows the
parameter configuration of these five cases in the {λ, ψA} space and in the {λ, Z} space,
respectively. In the following, we derive the boundary conditions for these five regions.
Case 1: Consider the upper-right triangle of figure 15, i.e., ψA ∈ (ψ¯, 1). Given
r∗ = rA = ρ, the law of motion for wage under financial integration is flat at the initial
steady state S. Compare the upper-right and the lower-right panels of figure 16. Multiple
steady states arise if the convex part of the law of motion for wage is at least tangent
with the 45◦ line at point M, i.e., wt = wt+1 = wM < wA and
∂wt+1
∂wt
‖wM ≥ 1. Rewrite
equations (C.25) and (C.26) to get the conditions that define region BC of figure 15
λ < α and ψ¯ < ψA ≤ min{ψBC , 1}, where ψBC ≡ (1− α)
(α
λ
) α
1−α
,
which is identical as conditions (C.15) in our model with σ = 1 and θ → 0.
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Case 2: Consider the lower-left triangular of figure 15 where the borrowing con-
straints are binding at the autarkic steady state with ψA ∈ (0, ψ¯) and rA = λρ1−ψA < ρ.
As shown in the upper-left panel of figure 16, given r∗ = rA under financial integration,
case B arises iff ∂wt+1
∂wt
‖wA ≥ 1. The solution is
λ < α and ψˆF < ψA ≤ ψ¯, where ψˆF ≡ 1− α.
which is identical as conditions (C.16) in our model with σ = 1 and θ → 0.
Case 3: consider the region with ψA < min{1 − α, 1 − λ}. Since ∂wt+1∂wt ‖wA < 1, the
autarkic steady state is stable under financial integration. Compare the upper-middle and
the lower-left panel of figure 16. Multiple steady states arise under financial integration,
if the kink point of the law of motion for wage is above the 45◦ line, i.e., w¯t+1 > w¯F .
There are two subcases.
• Case 3.1: if ψ1 > ψ¯ or equivalently (1 − ψA)ψ1−αA < λ, the kink point is at w¯F =
(1− λ)m and w¯t+1 = wA
(
1−ψA
λ
)ρ
. w¯t+1 ≥ w¯F gives
ψA(1− ψA)ρ ≥ (1− λ)λρ, ψA < min{1− α, ψ¯}, and (1− ψA)ψ1−αA < λ, (C.30)
which is identical as (C.17) in our model with σ = 1 and θ → 0.
• Case 3.2: if ψ1 < ψ¯ or equivalently (1−ψA)ψ1−αA > λ, the kink point is at w¯Ft = ψ1m
and w¯t+1 =
wA
ψαA
. w¯t+1 ≥ w¯F gives
(2− ψA)ψ1−αA ≥ 1, ψA < min{1− α, ψ¯}, and (1− ψA)ψ1−αA > λ, (C.31)
which is identical as (C.18) in our model with σ = 1 and θ → 0.
Region AB is defined by conditions (C.30) and (C.31).
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